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I. Introduction
The topic of executive compensation has received a great deal of recent
attention from the news media, courts, and policymakers. Newspapers have
reported on the seemingly exorbitant pay packages of chief executive officers
(CEOs) of high profile companies.' Disney's severance arrangement with its
former CEO Michael Ovitz has made its way through the Delaware court

1. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Goldman Chairman Gets a Bonus of$53.4 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006, at C2 (reporting the $53.4 million year-end bonus paid by Goldman

Sachs to Lloyd C. Blankfein); Eric Dash, Compensation Experts Offer Ways to Help Curb
Executive Salaries,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at C I (describing the phenomenon of"runaway
executive pay" and noting that CEO compensation has increased more than 600% in the past
twenty-five years after proper adjustment for inflation); Mark A. Stein, Highly PaidChief is
Paid$210 Million to Go Away, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at C2 (discussing the $210 million
severance package paid by Home Depot to its former CEO Robert L. Nardelli).
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system.2 The Securities and Exchange Commission recently promulgated
lengthy new regulations aimed at improving the transparency of certain
executive pay components. With the intent to limit executive compensation,
Congress is currently considering a bill that would impose tax penalties on
deferred compensation amounts in excess of $1,000,000. 4 And President
George W. Bush, in a recent speech on Wall Street, exhorted boards of
directors to "step up to their responsibilities" and ensure that "salaries and
bonuses of CEOs [are] based on their 5success at improving their companies and
bringing value to their shareholders.
The topic of executive compensation has also generated significant
academic discussion. For instance, in their highly influential book Pay Without
Performance,6 Professors Lucian Bebchuck and Jesse Fried argue that
significant corporate governance failures have led to unduly generous executive
pay packages and propose fundamental reform measures to resolve these
failures.7 Their arguments and proposals stimulated a whole wealth of
academic literature.8
Yet in all of this discussion, there has not been any significant discussion
or analysis of Congress's heretofore most direct attempt to control executive
compensation amounts. In 1993, during another period of intense criticism of
executive pay packages, Congress enacted § 162(m) of the Internal Revenue
Code, which generally disallows public companies a deduction for
nonperformance-based compensation in excess of $1,000,000 paid to the CEO
and the next three highest paid executives. The purpose of this legislation was
to enhance shareholder wealth in two ways: by reducing the overall level of
executive compensation and by influencing the composition of executive
compensation arrangements in favor of components that were more sensitive to
firm performance. 9
2. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Lit., 906 A.2d 27, 50 (Del. 2006)
(concluding that the company's board of directors complied with its fiduciary duties to
shareholders in negotiating and approving Ovitz's $130 million severance package).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006).
4. The Small Business and Work Opportunity Act of 2007, S. 349, 110th Cong. (2007).
5. Jim Rutenberg, Bush Tells Wall St. to Rethink Pay Practices,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2007, at Cl 1.
6. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).

THE UNFULFILLED

7. See id. at 1-12 (providing an overview of corporate governance concerns).
8. See William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament over Executive Compensation,93
CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2005) (describing the "academic tournament" stimulated by Bebchuk
& Fried).
9. See Robert M. Halperin, Young K. Kwon & Shelley C. Rhoades-Catanach, The
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During this time of mounting criticism of executive compensation norms,
there is political pressure on Congress to take further measures to intervene in
the relationship between the corporation and its managers. One such measure
is the $1,000,000 limit on deferred compensation described above.' ° Other
similar proposals are pending." Before taking these new measures, however,
Congress ought to first reflect upon the effectiveness of § 162(m) in achieving
its intended results.
The primary goal of this Article is to evaluate the efficacy of § 162(m). I
consider the likely effect of § 162(m) under the two currently prevailing (but
opposing) views of how executive compensation arrangements are negotiated in
the public company context.1 2 Under one view (the arm's length model), the
corporation's board of directors negotiates effectively on behalf of shareholders
in setting management compensation. 3 Under the other view (the managerial
power model), as a result of structural biases and other problems, the board is4
captured by management and is therefore willing to overpay management.'
Under the managerial power model, the only meaningful constraint on directors
and management is the risk that relevant outsiders would perceive the
compensation amounts as egregious. 15 To mute this constraint, the board and
Impact ofDeductibilityLimits on CompensationContracts: A TheoreticalExamination, 23 J.
AM. TAX. Ass'N 52, 52 (Supp. 2001) (noting these objectives of § 162(m)); John Graham &
Yonghan Julia Wu, Executive Compensation, Interlocked Compensation Committees and the
162(m) Cap on Tax Deductibility 7 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished working paper, on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=959686 ("The
legislation was enacted in response to the perceived excessive top executive pay, and intended
to promote broader application of performance-based compensation....").
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing a Congressional proposal to
impose tax penalties on deferred compensation amounts in excess of $1,000,000).
11. See, e.g., H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007) (requiring that shareholders be allowed to
vote on executive compensation arrangements); H.R. 3260, 110th Cong. (2007) (denying
company deductions for executive compensation in excess of twenty-five multiplied by the
salary of the company's lowest paid worker); S. 2, 110th Cong. (2007) (expanding the scope of
employees whose pay is subject to § 162(m)).
12. This Article does not specifically address whether the twin goals of § 162(m) (i.e.,
reducing the level of executive pay and increasing the performance-sensitivity of such pay) are
worthwhile legislative pursuits. As discussed in more detail below, under the arm's length
model, § 162(m) is unnecessary to achieve optimal compensation arrangements. Under the
managerial power model, pay is generally too high and too performance-insensitive;
accordingly, under that model the goals of § 162(m) are beneficial. The question under the
managerial power model is whether the goals of § 162(m) can realistically be achieved in light
of how the provision actually operates.
13. See BEBCI-IUK & FRED, supra note 6, at 17-20 (describing the arm's length model).
14. See id. at 61-80 (describing the managerial power model).
15. See id. at 65 ("Whether directors and managers will be deterred from adopting a given
compensation arrangement depends on the extent to which it will be viewed by relevant
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management collude to disguise and understate the true value of executive
16
compensation, according to adherents of the managerial power model.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that, under either model, § 162(m) is
likely ineffective. Instead of increasing shareholder wealth by limiting
executive compensation and aligning executive incentives, § 162(m) probably
has the opposite effect of decreasing shareholder wealth. Under the managerial
power model, this perverse result is possibly even more pronounced.
In addition to predicting the likely effect of § 162(m), this Article
considers empirical studies of its actual impact since its enactment almost
fifteen years ago. Most of the evidence is consistent with predictions under
both models, while other evidence is more consistent with one or the other
model under certain conditions.
Finally, the Article describes some unintended incidental effects of the
provision. Section 162(m) discourages the use of certain compensation
structures that are arguably more efficient, while favoring other flawed
structures. It encourages the use of formulaic bonus arrangements, which
themselves encourage accounting manipulation. Furthermore, the scope of
§ 162(m) is expanding through legislative inaction because the provision is not
adjusted for inflation.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the historical treatment
of executive compensation under the Code and then discusses the background
behind, and the operation of, § 162(m). Part III discusses the agency problems
inherent in the executive/firm relationship and the two competing models of
how executive compensation arrangements are negotiated. Part IV predicts the
likely effects of § 162(m) under each of the competing models. Part V then
considers the results of empirical studies of § 162(m). Part VI describes some
unintended incidental consequences of the provision. Part VII concludes.
II. Taxation of Executive Compensation
A. HistoricalTax Treatment of Executive Compensation
The Code allows a deduction only for "reasonable" compensation paid to
employees. 17 While the text of the statute suggests that all compensation paid
to an employee must be evaluated for its reasonableness, in practice this is not
the case. In fact, the reasonableness factor is almost exclusively used by the
outsiders as unjustified or even abusive or egregious.").
16. Id. at 67-70.
17. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000).
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IRS to deny deductions for payments that are in substance gifts or dividends but
are disguised as compensation. 18
For example, if a doctor subject to a 40% marginal tax rate wanted to
make a $10,000 gift to her college-aged son, the doctor could overpay the son
$10,000 for work performed for her medical practice and attempt to deduct the
amount. If this strategy were successful, the $10,000 excess "salary" would
save the doctor $4,000 in taxes.19 If the son were in a taxable position,2 ° the
overpayment would increase the son's taxes; 2' however, so long as the son's
marginal tax rate was less than 40%, the family unit's aggregate tax liability is
reduced at the expense of the fiSC. 2 2 The IRS would attack this strategy by
arguing that the son's compensation was unreasonably high, which, if
successful, would result in the denial of the doctor's deduction.
A similar tax avoidance strategy is sometimes used by closely held
corporations where the principal shareholders are also the principal employees.
If the shareholders/employees take cash out of the company through payment of
dividends, the corporation gets no deduction for the dividends.23 On the other
hand, if the shareholders/employees take cash out of the company through
payment of salaries and bonuses, the corporation is allowed a deduction for the
compensation payments (provided that the corporation's characterizations of
the payments are respected).24 Recognizing this, the IRS attempts to protect the
18. See 1 BoRis I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFrs 22.2.1 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that the IRS "almost never" uses the
reasonableness condition to deny deductions for salary unless the risk of disguised gift or
dividend is present).
19. The deduction would absorb $10,000 of otherwise taxed income, which at the 40%
marginal tax rate would have resulted in an increased tax liability of $4,000. To keep the
analysis of this hypothetical simple, I ignore the impact of federal employment taxes, which can,
in certain circumstances, be a significant consideration.
20. The son might not be in a taxable position because he might not have income that
exceeds the sum of his standard deduction, personal exemption, and other deductions (e.g., the
deduction for higher education expenses in § 222). In addition, the son may have credits (such
as the HOPE and Lifetime Learning credits for education expenses) that could absorb any
remaining tax liability.
21. If the doctor had simply gifted the $10,000, the son would not pay tax on the amount
because I.R.C. § 102 excludes gifts from gross income.
22. For example, assume that the son is in the 15% marginal tax bracket. If the doctor
simply gifted the $10,000, the doctor would pay $4,000 of tax on the $10,000 because she
receives no deduction. The son would not owe any tax because he has received a gift. If the
overpayment strategy is successful, the doctor would owe no tax on the $10,000 (because she
receives a deduction which offsets the income) while the son would owe $1,500 in additional
tax (i.e., $10,000 x 15%). If the overpayment strategy is successful, the family unit saves
$2,500 in taxes (i.e., $4,000 - $1,500).
23. I.R.C. § 311(a)(2000).
24. The benefits of bailing out corporate earnings through payments characterized as
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tax base by ensuring that purported salary payments to shareholder/employees
are not in substance disguised dividends, relying on the reasonableness factor to
do the heavy lifting in this regard. A critical factor in the reasonableness
analysis in the corporate context is therefore the degree of overlap between the
employees and the shareholders.25 Ifthe corporation has four 25% shareholders
who each perform similar services for the corporation, the risk of disguised
dividends is very high. If, on the other hand, only one of the four shareholders
is an employee of the corporation, the risk of disguised dividends is very low
because the nonemployee shareholders would generally be unwilling to allow
off their share of some of the corporate
the one employee/shareholder to siphon
26
earnings for his exclusive benefit.
In the public company context, concerns about disguised gifts or dividends
are simply not present, and therefore there is no need for the IRS to scrutinize
the level of executive compensation to protect the tax base. One could certainly
argue that executive compensation is not set by an arm's length process and,
therefore, that part of executive pay constitutes "rents" extracted by
management as a result of this flawed process.27 However, even these rents
would generally constitute an ordinary and necessary expense that should be
deductible by the corporation in arriving at corporate taxable income.28 These
rents are simply a cost of doing business as a public company where ownership
and control are separate by virtue of administrative necessity. 29 Conceptually,
therefore, compensation paid to executives of public companies ought to be
deductible in full, even if part of the compensation can properly be
characterized as rents. 30 This is consistent with the general practice of the IRS
compensation instead of dividends have been reduced by the tax rate cut on dividends enacted
in 2003, see I.R.C. § 1(h)(l 1), which is scheduled to expire on December 31,2010. Pub. L. No.
109-222, § 102, 119 Stat. 365 (2003). For analysis of this impact of the dividend tax rate cut,
see Alan L. Feld, Dividends Reconsidered, 101 TAx NOTEs 1117 (2003).
25. See PAUL R. McDANIEL, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & DANIEL L. SIMMONS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATiONS 228 (3d ed. 2006) (noting the importance of
proportionality in this context).
26. This assumes that the four shareholders are unrelated. If the shareholders are related,
then there is a risk that the transaction is a disguised dividend combined with a disguised gift
(from the donor/shareholder who would be entitled to the dividend to the donee/employee who
receives the "compensation").
27. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supranote 6 (discussing the corporate governance
concerns implicated by executive compensation arrangements).
28. See I.R.C. § 162(a).
29. Alternatively, one could characterize the rent extraction as theft by the executives.
Since theft losses are deductible, Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1 (d)(3) (1996), the payment of these rents
by the corporation would still be deductible under this view.
30. Other considerations support this conclusion. It would be administratively quite
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to scrutinize compensation arrangements for corporate executives only in the
closely held context where there is a significant overlap between those
work for the company and those individuals who own shares in
individuals who
31
the company.

B. Enactment of§ 162(m)
In 1993, in response to public outcry over the level and performanceinsensitivity of executive pay, Congress added § 162(m) to the Code.32 While
this provision was sometimes justified by its proponents as denying a "subsidy"
for excessive executive pay, most proponents properly characterized it as a
penalty for what they considered the illegitimate compensation practices of
public companies.33 Section 162(m) was intended both to reduce the overall
level of executive compensation and to make such compensation more sensitive
to firm performance.34
It is clear that § 162(m) is not grounded in tax policy considerations; as
noted above, executive compensation ought to be deductible in full regardless
of whether some portion constitutes rents. 35 Rather, the provision is simply a
penalty that is administered through the tax code.36
difficult to distinguish between the compensation versus rent portions of an executive's
remuneration. In addition, depending on the incidence of the corporate tax, denying the
deduction for the rent portion might only add to the agency cost borne by shareholders: The
shareholders first overpay for executive services and then they may incur the brunt of the extra
corporate tax attributable to denying the deduction for such overpayment.
31. See 1 BORis I. BITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFrs 22.2.2 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that "[v]irtually all reasonable compensation
cases involve family corporations or other closely held enterprises").
32. See Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: UnintendedConsequences of
Trying to Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1673,
1686 (2004) (noting that § 162(m) was enacted "after the populist outrage over executive
compensation reached a high during the 1992 presidential race").
33. Allowing a corporate deduction for executive compensation, even where part of the
pay consists of rents, is not a subsidy. As noted above, even the rent portion of the
compensation ought to be deductible in arriving at corporate taxable income because the rents
are a cost of doing business. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. As a result,
disallowing the deduction is not properly characterized as the withdrawal of a subsidy; instead,
disallowing the deduction is best viewed as the imposition of a penalty.
34. Supra note 9 and accompanying text.
35. Supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
36. Section 162(m) and similar provisions (e.g., § 280G (denying deductions for
excessive golden parachute payments) and § 162(l) (denying deductions for fines paid)) are thus
analogous to the whole host of tax expenditures, provisions in the Code which are designed to
subsidize favored activities. The classic example of a tax expenditure might be the home
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In general, § 162(m) disallows a deduction for certain compensation
("nonqualified" compensation) in excess of $1,000,000 paid by public
companies to its CEO and next three highest paid executives. The $1,000,000
limit is applied annually. 37 For purposes of § 162(m), qualified compensation
is not subject to the $1,000,000 limit. 38 Qualified compensation is
remuneration that is paid pursuant to a plan that (i) provides for payments based
on objective performance goals, (ii) is approved by an independent
compensation committee of the board, and (iii) is approved by a majority of the
shareholders after disclosure of the material terms of the compensation
arrangement. 9 With respect to stock options and stock appreciation rights,4 °
they are generally considered qualified compensation if they are not "in-themoney"4 at the time of grant, provided that the independent director and

mortgage interest deduction, which allows a deduction for an otherwise nondeductible expense
in order to subsidize the activity of borrowing to purchase owner-occupied housing. "Negative"
tax expenditures, like § 162(m), are designed to penalize disfavored behavior.
37. I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2000). Technically, the statute applies to compensation earned by
the CEO and any other employee whose compensation "is required to be reported to
shareholders under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by reason of such employee being
among the 4 highest compensated officers for the taxable year (other than the chief executive
officer"). I.R.C. § 162(m)(3) (emphasis added). Because the SEC's recently issued rules
relating to executive compensation now require the reporting of compensation earned by the
CEO, the CFO, and the next three highest compensated executives, the IRS has indicated that it
will interpret § 162(m)(3) to apply only to compensation earned by the CEO and the next three
highest compensated executives. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE BULLETIN, NOTICE

2007-49 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/irb/2007-

25 irb/ar1 2.html ("The IRS will interpret the term 'covered employee' for purposes of§ 162(m)
to mean any employee [whose total compensation] is required to be reported to shareholders
under the Exchange Act by reason of such employee being among the 3 highest compensated
officers ....
").
38. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C).
39. Id.
40. A stock option is the right to purchase a share of stock at a specified "exercise price"
(usually the fair market value on the date of grant) during a specified period of time (usually ten
years from grant). A stock appreciation right (SAR) gives the holder the right to a payment
measured by the difference between the fair market value of the stock on the date of exercise
and a specified price (usually the fair market value of the stock on the date of grant). SARs
usually have a term often years. Because employees usually sell the stock received immediately
upon option exercise, stock options and SARs are functionally equivalent from the standpoint of
the employee. From the employer's perspective, SARs (unlike stock options) do not dilute the
number of shares outstanding. Both stock options and SARs usually vest over time, meaning
that they become exercisable only after a specified period of employment with the firm.
41. An option is not in-the-money if the exercise price is equal to or greater than the fair
market value of the underlying stock at the time of grant.
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shareholder approval requirements are met with respect to the plan under which
the options or rights are granted.42
Prior to the enactment of § 162(m), executive bonuses were generally paid
at the discretion of the board of directors. In order for bonus arrangements to
qualify under § 162(m), they must be objectively determinable.4 3 However, the
regulations provide that boards may retain "negative discretion"-i.e., the
formulasability to reduce bonus amounts that are derived from objective
44
without impairing the qualified status of the bonus plan.
Under current compensation practices, the most common types of
nonqualified compensation that trigger § 162(m) are salaries and discretionary
bonuses. 45 Amounts paid under objective bonus plans (either with or without
negative discretion of the board) and stock option grants are the most common
types of qualified compensation.46
III. Two Models of Executive Compensation
This Part will describe the two competing (though not wholly
contradictory) views of how executive compensation is negotiated. 7 Under
42. With respect to the stock option plan, shareholders need only approve the total
number of options subject to the plan, the maximum number of options that an employee may
receive under the plan, and the terms of the options.
43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(ii) (1996) ("A formula or standard is objective if a
third party having knowledge of the relevant performance results could calculate the amount to
be paid to the employee. In addition, a formula or standard must specify the individual
employees or class of employees to which it applies.").
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(iii)(A).
45. See Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, RegulatingExecutive Pay: Using the Tax
Code to Influence ChiefExecutive Officer Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 138, 141 (2002)
(discussing the effects of § 162(m) on executive compensation).
46. See id. (discussing qualified performance-based compensation).
47. See Bebchuk and Fried, in an article co-authored with David Walker, describe the
relationship between the two models as follows:
Although the managerial power approach is conceptually quite different from the
[arm's length] approach, the former is not proposed as a complete replacement for
the latter. One can take the view that compensation arrangements are shaped both
by managerial power and by what would be optimal. The managerial power
approach merely implies that compensation practices cannot be adequately
explained by optimal contracting alone. Rather, practices might be adopted that
deviate significantly from those suggested by optimal contracting. Under the
managerial power approach, compensation practices can be fully understood only
with careful attention to the role of managerial power.
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, ManagerialPowerandRent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 755 (2002).
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one view, executives negotiate their pay with a board of directors that strives to
get the best deal possible for shareholders, thereby maximizing firm value.4
Under the other, executives negotiate with a compliant board of directors that is
willing to overpay management as long as it will not raise red flags to relevant
outsiders. 49 Before describing these two models in more detail, the agency
problems inherent in the executive-firm relationship are discussed.
A. Agency Costs
In any employment relationship, there exist conflicts of interest between
the parties. The most significant is usually the problem of shirking. 50 All else
(e.g., pay) being equal, employees would generally desire to give less effort, to
the detriment of the employer. If this problem is significant, the employer
could (ex ante) negotiate for some or all of the employee's pay to be based on
some performance metric, thus increasing the alignment of the employer and
employee's interests. 5' The employee would presumably require a higher
amount of total compensation with this new compensation mix because: (i) the
adjusted compensation mix no longer allows the employee to impose the full
cost of shirking on the employer and (ii) the adjustment to the compensation
arrangement will often shift risk from the employer
to the employee, who is
52
generally more risk-averse than the employer.
48. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 17-20 (describing the arm's length model).
Negotiating the best deal for shareholders does not necessarily mean obtaining the executive's
services for the cheapest price. It may mean negotiating compensation structures that help to
align the executive's interests with the shareholders' interests. See id at 19 (suggesting one way
to align such interests is to base the CEO's compensation in part on increasing shareholder
value).
49. See id. at 61-79 (describing the managerial power model).
50. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEx. L.
REv. 1615, 1620-23 (2005) (describing the problem of shirking by employees).
51. See id. (discussing solutions for the problem of shirking).
52. See id. If the employee could perfectly and costlessly hedge this additional risk by,
for example, purchasing a financial derivative, then this factor would be negated. In the public
company executive context, there are significant contractual, securities law, and tax law
constraints that either prohibit hedging strategies or make them unduly costly to implement. See
David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 440, 459-93 (2000) (describing the existing contractual,
securities law, and tax barriers to hedging); see also Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The
Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP., 49, 55 (2003) ("Press accounts sometimes
claim that executives can effectively hedge or unwind the risk of their options through financial
transactions (involving derivatives) with investment banks. But we know of no evidence
showing that this practice is widespread, and our many conversations with knowledgeable
practitioners suggest that this practice is quite rare."). As a result, this Article ignores the
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For example, assume that MGM is negotiating with Tom Cruise to star
in an upcoming movie and that MGM would be willing to pay Cruise
$20,000,000 cash. Also assume that Cruise would be willing to accept
$20,000,000 cash. However, MGM is concerned that, if it were to pay only
cash, Cruise would give less than optimal effort in making and promoting
the movie. If MGM instead offers Cruise nontransferable royalty rights in
the movie that have an objective ex ante fair market value of $20,000,000,
he would likely value those rights as worth less than $20,000,000 cash
because he could no longer shirk at the sole expense of MGM and because
the cash is for the most part risk-free, 53 while the royalty rights may
ultimately turn out to be worth much less than $20,000,000. 54 By making

Cruise effectively a partner in producing the movie, risk is shifted from
MGM (a more efficient risk-bearer) to Cruise (a less efficient risk-bearer).5 5
As a result, we might expect to see the parties strike a bargain where some
amount of compensation is cash and some is performance-based and where
the total expected value of the compensation exceeds $20,000,000. Such
an arrangement would maximize the expected value to the parties after
taking into account the possibility of shirking and their respective
preferences regarding risk.
In an arm's length arrangement (such as the MGM/Cruise contract),
we would expect that the parties would reach the optimal mix of
performance and nonperformance based compensation. As a result,
lawmakers do not have much interest in regulating the MGM/Cruise
compensation arrangement, a deal struck between two sophisticated parties,

possibility of executive hedging.
53. Of course, if the cash payment is deferred until after Cruise performs, Cruise is subject
to the risk that MGM will become bankrupt or insolvent before he is paid. Even if Cruise is
paid simultaneously with or before performance, Cruise will risk incurring opportunity costs if
MGM goes bankrupt between the time he agrees to do the movie and the time he realizes that
MGM will not fully perform under the agreement (because Cruise could not agree to appear in
any other movies during the time he is required to work on MGM's). If MGM is quite solvent,
these risks are insignificant.
54. The royalty rights could also turn out to be worth much more than $20,000,000.
55. MGM is more efficient at bearing risk for a variety of reasons. First, MGM makes
more movies than Cruise; therefore, its investment in the particular movie is more diversified
than Cruise's. Second, MGM's owners (i.e., the owners of Disney) are themselves able to
diversify by making investments in other companies. Cruise, meanwhile, has a relatively large,
undiversified investment in the movie. He will devote substantial time and effort in making the
movie, and the movie may have a significant impact on his reputation and future incomeproducing capacity.
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even though some might think that Cruise57is grossly overpaid. 56 Policy
makers are content to let the market work.
In the senior executive/firm context, another significant agency problem
involves the willingness of corporate policy-makers to cause the firm to take on
additional risk.5 8 Managers are typically more risk-averse than shareholders of
the firm with respect to firm-specific risk because managers make an
undiversified investment of human capital in the firm. If the firm does very
poorly, managers will lose their job and status, and their reputation and future
income-producing capacity could be adversely affected.
Meanwhile,
shareholders can readily diversify their firm-specific risk by investing in other
firms; they are therefore much less risk-averse than managers. 59 As a result,
managers might choose projects that entail a level of risk that is sub-optimal
from the shareholders' perspective. In addition, managers might choose to
finance projects using equity or existing cash instead of debt even though debtfinancing (which is more risky than equity-financing) 60 might best increase firm
value.
Like the problem of shirking, risk-based agency costs can, in theory, be
ameliorated by substituting performance-based compensation for cash. If an
executive is paid only cash, she will get the amount of cash she is due, no
matter how well the firm performs, so long as it does not become insolvent. In
this regard, the executive is akin to an unsecured creditor, which is subject only
to insolvency risk but does not participate in corporate growth to any extent.
By giving the executive performance-based compensation, the executive now
does participate in corporate growth. 61 As a result, the executive is more likely
to promote a corporate policy of optimal risk-taking.
56. Of course, policymakers might be concerned about redistributing wealth. Historically,
such redistributive efforts in the United States have focused on relative amounts of wealth (or
income) and not on their source (e.g., entrepreneurial efforts, investment returns, inheritance,
luck, or a favorable employment contract).
57. In the senior executive/firm context, it may be questioned whether shirking in fact is a
significant problem. Do CEOs respond to performance-sensitive pay with increased effort?
And, if so, do increases in CEO effort at the margin translate into increased firm performance
after taking into account the additional compensation required by the CEO to offset the
additional risk incurred by her in accepting performance-sensitive pay in lieu of cash? For
discussion of these issues, see Bainbridge, supra note 50, at 1632-35.
58. See id. at 1621.
59. See Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the
Theory of Overreliance,54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1366 n.36 (2003).
60. Debt-financing increases the leverage of the firm, which increases the reward to
shareholders if the company is profitable enough to service the debt. On the flip side, increasing
leverage increases the risk of firm insolvency or bankruptcy.
61. As noted above, this Article ignores the prospect of executive hedging strategies due
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Certain performance-based structures are better than others in ameliorating
the risk-based agency costs. For example, options are quite beneficial in this
regard. As noted above, executives are more risk-averse than shareholders
because of their large and undiversified human capital investment in the firm.
Option-holders, on the other hand, are more risk-preferring because, while they
participate in share increases above the exercise price, they do not suffer from
share decreases below the exercise price (no matter how great).62 As a result,
compensatory options should, in theory, counteract the effect of executive riskaverseness. On the other hand, formulaic-based bonus arrangements may not
be as useful in ameliorating the risk-based agency costs. Researchers have
found that these bonus arrangements typically "result in a greater penalty for
extreme negative performance and a smaller reward for extreme positive
performance., 63 Thus, these arrangements will not be as helpful in
counteracting executive risk-averseness.
In summary, while shirking and risk-based agency costs push at the
margin in favor of greater performance-based compensation relative to cash
compensation, the executive's risk-averseness pushes in the other direction. As
such, determining the optimal level of performance-based compensation
relative to salary is a difficult task.
B. The Arm's Length Model
Under the arm's length model, the board of directors negotiates, on behalf
of shareholders, just as effectively as the parties in the hypothetical
MGM/Cruise arrangement. Under this model, the market will take into account
the competing factors, ultimately resulting in the optimal overall level of
executive compensation as well as the optimal mix of performance-based
compensation and salary. 64
to legal constraints that make them difficult or impossible to implement. See supra note 52.
62. Option holders are more risk-preferring than stockholders because, while option
holders participate in corporate growth above the exercise price just like shareholders, they
(unlike shareholders) do not suffer from reductions in stock price below the exercise price.
Thus, compensatory options may balance out to some extent the impact of executive riskaverseness.
63. Austin Reitenga et al., CEOBonus Pay, Tax Policy, andEarningsManagement,24 J.
Am.TAX. Ass'N 1, 2 (Supp. 2002). This results from the fact that most objective bonus
arrangements use a formula whereby the bonus is based on results within 80% to 120% of the
targeted performance. As a result, performance above 120% does not increase the bonus
payment, while performance below 80% results in no bonus.
64. In light of the cozy relationship between boards and management, the arm's length
model might appear naive. However, it must be remembered that the market should in theory
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C. The ManagerialPower Model
On the other side of the spectrum is the managerial power model, which is
based on the assumption that primarily because of structural bias, directors do
not bargain at arm's length with managers. 65 As a result, the model suggests
that executive compensation structures are more generous and less
performance-sensitive than those that would be the product of arm's length
bargaining. The structural bias results primarily from the fact that directors are
often, as a de facto matter, appointed by management.66 In addition, because
management and directors work closely together and often run in the same
social circles, it is argued that directors do not negotiate as hard as they would
with truly adverse parties. 67
Finally, because directors are part-time
independent contractors, they are unwilling to devote the time necessary to
effectively negotiate and design executive compensation structures, according
to adherents of the managerial power model.68
Under the managerial power model, the only significant constraint to
excessive management compensation is the risk of outrage "shared by those
outsiders whose views matter most to [the directors and executives]."6 9
Adherents of the managerial power view argue that, to ameliorate this risk,
directors and management devote considerable energy in devising ways to
camouflage the real value of executive compensation arrangements.7v
react adversely to poorly structured or overgenerous executive compensation structures. As a
result, all else being equal, capital should flow into firms with "good" compensation

arrangements and away from ones with "bad" compensation arrangements, resulting in
corresponding changes to market price of firms. Such a market reaction would act as a check in
keeping the parties honest in negotiating executive pay. Whether this in fact occurs has been the
subject of vigorous debate. Compare Bainbridge, supra note 50, at 1635-37 (arguing that the

absence of contractual constraints on managerial power in the IPO context "is an important-an
unanswered-strike against the managerial power model"), with BEBCHUK & FRIED, supranote
6, at 53-58 (arguing that while the market does exert influence, this influence does not prevent
results that depart from those obtained through arm's length bargaining).
65. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 61-65 (describing the managerial power
model).
66. See id. at 25 (arguing that while a desire to be reelected should encourage directors to
be attentive to shareholder needs, the reality is that the director slate proposed by company
managers is almost never challenged).
67. See id. at 31-34.
68. See id. at 36-37.
69. See id.
at 66.
70. See id.
at 67 ("The main costs to directors and managers of adopting compensation
arrangements that favor managers, then, depend mainly not on how costly the arrangements
actually are to shareholders, but on how costly the arrangements are perceived to be by
important outsiders.").

64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 877 (2007)

IV. Effect of Section § 162(m) Under Each Model
A. Arm's Length Model
7
Under this model, the amount and mix of compensation would generally '
be optimal without any intervention by policymakers. In the absence of
§ 162(m), the parties would take into account the competing issues of
(i) shirking and risk-based agency costs and (ii) manager risk-averseness, and
they would arrive at the optimal (i.e., shareholder-wealth maximizing)
compensation arrangement. The agency costs push in favor of performancebased compensation, which shifts additional firm specific risk to the manager.
Because of the manager's risk-averseness, the manager will demand a higher
market value of performance-based compensation vis-A-vis cash.72 Under the
arm's length model, these factors would ultimately result in an equilibrium,
with some mix of incentive (risky) compensation and cash compensation to
maximize firm value.
Section 162(m), which presumably was based on Congress's perception
that the arm's length model is not accurate, upsets this balance. The provision
pushes in favor of riskier incentive compensation by making salary (and other
nonqualified compensation) more expensive once the $1,000,000 threshold is
reached.73 At the margin, this creates a wedge between the type of
compensation that executives prefer to receive and the type of compensation
that the firm is willing to pay. How the burden of this wedge is borne is a
function of the parties' bargain. If the result is that the executive simply
accepts the riskier compensation without any adjustment in the market value of
the compensation, then the executive has borne it by taking on more risk than
he or she would like without any compensation. If the result is that the firm
pays the executive a higher market value of riskier compensation to compensate
the executive in full for taking on the extra undesired risk, then the firm has
borne the burden of the § 162(m) wedge. Finally, the parties could share the

71. As described below, under the implicit contracting costs theory, the arm's length
model could result in underpayment of management. This theory suggests that intense public
scrutiny of management compensation precludes public companies from designing efficient
compensation arrangements. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (describing the
implicit contracting costs theory).
72. Due to significant legal constraints on potential executive hedging strategies, this
Article assumes that they will not be implemented. See supranote 52 and accompanying text.
73. The amount of the increase in the cost of nonqualified compensation above
$1,000,000 is a function of the corporation's marginal tax rate. If t is the marginal tax rate of the
company, denying the deduction will increase the after-tax cost ofnonqualified compensation in
excess of $1,000,000 (the excess compensation) by an amount equal to the product of (i) the
amount of the excess compensation and (ii) the ratio of t/(l - t).
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burden of § 162(m). In that case, the executive would receive a higher market
value of compensation than he or she would have received in the absence of
§ 162(m), but the higher value is insufficient to offset fully the burden of taking
on the additional risk. The effects of § 162(m) under the arm's length model
are considered in more detail below.
1. Avoidance
If it were costless to avoid § 162(m) by, for example, disguising cash
compensation as performance-based, we would expect arm's length parties to
do exactly that. This would allow the parties to avoid the § 162(m) wedge and
to retain, in substance, an optimal compensation design without losing
deductions under § 162(m).
In fact, there are two possible circumvention strategies, though they are
costless. First, companies may require the executive to defer
entirely
not
receipt of any nonperformance-based compensation in excess of $1,000,000
until she retires from the company.7 4 Because § 162(m) only applies to
compensation received by current employees,7 5 the entire amount paid would
be deductible by the employer at the time of payment. The costs of
implementing this deferral strategy stem primarily from the fact that, because
the excess compensation is retained by the company (instead of being paid out
to the executive currently), the executive places the excess compensation at the
risk of the company's insolvency or bankruptcy. 76 In addition, the executive
loses liquidity because she currently cannot spend the excess compensation, but
74. Upon retirement, the company will pay the executive the amount deferred plus a
specified investment return thereon. The investment return is necessary to account for the timevalue of money. Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred
Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REv. 571, 576 (2007).
75. I.R.C. § 162(m)(3) (2000) (stating that covered employees include only those who are
employees of the company as of the close of the taxable year). A similar deferral strategy would
be for the executive to defer receipt of the compensation until the time when the covered
employee's nonqualified compensation falls below the $1,000,000 threshold. Recently enacted
§ 409A would now impose potentially significant tax costs on this strategy. See I.R.C.
§ 409A(a)(1) & (2) (requiring immediate income realization for deferred compensation
arrangement that allow for contingent distributions that are not triggered by the employee's
separation from service, disability, death, change in the ownership of the employer, or the
occurrence of an unforeseeable emergency).
76. In order for the deferral to be effective for federal income tax purposes, the amounts
deferred must remain subject to the claims of the employer's creditors. See Treas. Reg. § 1.833(e) (1996); Gregg D.Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing the Promiseto Pay, 89 MNN. L. REV.
1092, 1139 (2005). Had the executive been paid the cash currently, the executive's
compensation would no longer be subject to the risk of employer bankruptcy or insolvency.
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this is not likely a significant cost because one would expect that executives
whose pay is subject to § 162(m) (i.e., senior executives with annual
nonqualified compensation in excess of $1,000,000) would ordinarily be
sufficiently wealthy and/or credit-worthy to mitigate substantially any liquidity
problems."
Second, the parties could disguise fixed compensation as performancebased by using easy to reach objective bonus targets. The regulations
promulgated under § 162(m) explain that a "performance goal need not ... be
based on an increase or positive result under a business criterion and could
78
include, for example, maintaining the status quo or limiting economic losses.*"
However, at the time that the bonus arrangement is structured, the outcome
must be "substantially uncertain. 09 Two examples in the regulations apply this
substantially uncertain condition. In one example a bonus based on a
percentage ofprofits is sufficient, while in the other example a bonus based on
a percentage of sales is not.80 The regulations explain this result by noting that,
while a company is "virtually certain" to have some sales during the year,81 "it
is substantially uncertain whether a company will have profits for a specified
future period even if the company has a history of profitability. 82 In another
example, a bonus payable on the favorable settlement of litigation fails the
"substantially uncertain" factor where the bonus arrangement was established
after the other side has already "informally indicated... [its] willingness to
settle the litigation [favorably]. 8 3 These highly stylized examples are not very
helpful in giving taxpayers guidance regarding the application of the
substantially uncertain condition.

77. While the corporation's deduction is deferred, this will not increase the corporation's
after-tax compensation costs provided that the executive's deferred compensation account grows
by an after-tax rate of return. See Yale & Polsky, supra note 74, at 625. Accordingly, putting
aside the risk of firm insolvency and the burden of executive illiquidity, a properly structured
deferral arrangement can avoid the impact of § 162(m), while remaining economically
consistent with the original arrangement (i.e., current cash compensation) of the parties.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i) (1996). Note that this rule is conceptually inconsistent
with the regulations' treatment of stock options, which must have an exercise price equal to or
above the fair market value of the underlying stock at the time of grant in order to qualify as
performance-based. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A). For further discussion of the
treatment of stock options under § 162(m), see infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text, and
Part V.A.
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vii), ex. 2 & 3.
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2), ex. 2.
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2), ex. 3.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2), ex. 4.
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Because of the vagueness of this condition, the easy-to-reach bonus
circumvention strategy creates the risk that the IRS and the company will
disagree as to how it will be construed, which could result in litigation and
increased tax liability. 84 As the likelihood of the bonus payment approaches
certainty, this litigation risk increases. On the other hand, as the likelihood of
payment becomes less certain, more risk is imposed on the risk-averse
executive, undermining the effectiveness of this avoidance strategy. Another
significant problem with the strategy is that the material terms of bonus
arrangements, including performance goals, must be disclosed to and approved
by shareholders in order to qualify under § 162(m).85 Even if it makes sense for
the firm to set bonus targets extremely low so as to minimize its after-tax
compensation costs, as a public relations matter it may be difficult
for the firm
86
to justify bonus standards that are obviously easy to reach.

84. These risks are exacerbated by administrative law doctrine regarding the appropriate
level ofjudicial deference afforded an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Under the
so-called Seminole Rock doctrine, an agency's interpretation of its own regulations will
ordinarily be upheld unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Bowles
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945). See also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452, 461 (1997) (upholding interpretation and citing Seminole Rock). Because of this
deference, a taxpayer could expect that any reasonable interpretation of the "substantially
uncertain" factor would be upheld.
85. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii) (2000). Treasury regulations provide "[tihe material
terms include the employees eligible to receive compensation; a description of the business
criteria on which the performance goal is based; and either the maximum amount of
compensation that could be paid to any employee or the formula used to calculate the amount of
compensation to be paid to the employee.., if the performance goal is attained.... ." Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(4)(i) (1996).
The regulations go on to provide, however, that
(i) "[d]isclosure of the business criteria on which the performance goal is based need not include
the specific targets that must be satisfied under the performance goal," Treas. Reg. § 1.16227(e)(4)(iii)(A), and (ii) a material term need not be disclosed if"the compensation committee
determines that the information is confidential commercial or business information, the
disclosure of which would have an adverse effect on the [company]," Treas. Reg. § 1.16227(e)(4)(iii)(B). It has been argued that the current § 162(m) disclosure standards are
ineffective in ensuring that shareholders have the requisite information necessary to evaluate
bonus arrangements. See Effectiveness of§ 162(m) in Controlling Executive Pay: Hearing
Before the S. Finance Comm., 109th Cong. D914 (2006) [hereinafter Effectiveness] (testimony
of Steven Balsam, Professor of Accounting, Temple University) (testifying that current
disclosures "lack specificity with regard to actual plan parameters, targets, thresholds, etc." and
suggesting that disclosure of this information would "increase the link between pay and
performance as directors and executives would be less likely to set low standards").
86. As discussed above, it is not entirely clear that the current disclosure standards in the
Treasury regulations would make extremely easy-to-reach bonus arrangements obvious to
shareholders. See supra note 85. To the extent that the laxity of an easy-to-reach bonus
arrangement can be hidden from shareholders, the only constraint on using this circumvention
strategy is audit risk.
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The most feasible circumvention strategy, therefore, appears to be the one
of mandatory deferral. To the extent that § 162(m) is circumvented in this
manner, the provision does nothing except to impose additional transaction
costs on the parties because of the insolvency risk and illiquidity burden placed
upon the executive. To what extent these burdens are shifted to the company in
the form of higher compensation is a function of the relative elasticity of the
supply of, and demand for, individuals capable of managing public companies.
Research using the arm's length model suggests that
at a minimum, a portion of
87
these burdens would be shifted to the company.
2. Substitution Effect
a. SubstitutingIncentive Compensationfor Cash
If avoidance is costly, we might expect to see a substitution effect whereby
the parties substitute deductible incentive compensation for nondeductible cash
compensation. In general, stock options or formulaic bonus arrangements
could be substituted for cash compensation. There are two advantages of using
stock options as compared to formulaic bonuses. First, implementation costs
are reduced because there is no need to negotiate any complex formulas, to
explain these formulas to executives, board members, or investors, or to make
calculations to determine payouts. Second, there is likely less of an incentive to
manipulate accounting results because options-unlike formulaic bonuses-are
not based on specific accounting results (e.g., return on equity) that relate to
specific accounting periods (e.g., the current fiscal year).88
On the other hand, there may be advantages to using formulaic bonuses
instead of stock options. Stock options that qualify under § 162(m) are of the
"one size fits all" variety. In order to qualify as performance-based under the
87. Cf Halperin et al., supra note 9, at 63 (predicting that, as a result of the enactment
§ 162(m), firm profitability would decline in part because compensation expense would increase
to offset the additional risk placed upon the executive when incentive compensation is
substituted for cash compensation).
88. See Reitenga et al., supra note 63, at 1-23 (finding that finns with formulaic
§ 162(m)-qualified bonus plans engaged in greater income-smoothing behavior than firms
without such plans); see also Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive
Compensation, 63 U. CrN. L. REv. 713, 739 (1995) (predicting that § 162(m) "will encourage
compensation committees to rely heavily on explicit accounting-based bonuses, which, in turn,
will encourage executives to focus on and manipulate short-term earnings at the expense of
long-term value creation"). This is not to say that the issuance of stock options does not create
incentives to manipulate. The point is that formulaic bonuses, because they are based wholly on
specific accounting results, likely create stronger incentives.
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§ 162(m) regulations, stock options cannot ever have a strike price below the
underlying stock's fair market value on the date of grant.8 9 Indexed optionsones whose strike price fluctuates with a benchmark such as the Dow Jones
Industrial Average-are therefore not qualified under § 162(m) because if the
benchmark depreciates in value, the original strike price would be reduced. 90
Accordingly, fixed at-the-money options are universally used.
As a result, while options cannot be structured to account for market-wide
or industry-wide impacts, formulaic bonus arrangements can be designed to
account for such impacts. 9' Similarly, formulaic bonuses can be structured so
as to be based primarily on factors that are under the control of the executive.
For example, if an executive has more control over the costs of a business as
compared to its revenues, bonuses could be based strictly on bringing down
costs. Finally, formulaic bonuses offer greater flexibility with respect to the
amount of risk foisted upon the executive. Because executives are risk-averse,
this gives the parties the opportunity to reduce the size of the burden created by
§ 162(m).
If the executive were not risk-averse, substitution into either options or
formulaic bonuses could be accomplished without increasing the cost of the
executive's compensation. For example, assume that in the absence of
§ 162(m), the parties would have agreed to a fixed salary of $1,500,000.92
After the enactment of § 162(m), the parties could agree to a fixed salary of
$1,000,000 and a $1,000,000 performance-based bonus with a 50% likelihood
of payment in full and a 50% likelihood of no payment whatsoever. If the
executive were risk neutral, this arrangement has the same ex ante value to the
executive as the all-cash arrangement, and the company would not lose any
89. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1996).
90. See id. (providing that, in order for compensation attributable to a stock option or
stock appreciation right to qualify under § 162(m), it must be based solely on an increase in the
value of the stock after the date of grant or award). See also David M. Schizer, Reducing the
Tax Costs of Indexed Options, 96 TAX NoTEs 1375, 1377-80 (2002) (suggesting that an
argument can be made that indexed options qualify under the regulations, but ultimately
concluding that tax counsel would not give a favorable opinion on the issue without the IRS
issuing a private letter ruling or amending the regulation).
91. For example, bonuses could be based on the performance of the firm relative to other
similar firms.
92. Under the arm's length model, it is assumed that this $1,500,000 fixed salary structure
is optimal. Thus, it is assumed either that (i) there is no need for any performance-based
component (because, for example, the risk of shirking is extremely low) or (ii) the marginal cost
of using this riskier component outweighs its incremental benefit. Though this assumption may
be unrealistic in certain circumstances, it keeps the example simple and does not change the
ultimate conclusion that substitution under the arm's length model invariably imposes an
additional cost on the parties.
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deductions under § 162(m). 93 However, as previously discussed, corporate
executives are risk-averse. 94 As a result, substitution will result in an extra cost
to the parties and the allocation of that cost between the two parties will be a
function of their bargain.
For example, assume that the executive, due to her risk-averseness, would
be indifferent between choosing $500,000 of risk-free compensation and
$1,500,000 of potential bonuses which she has a fifty percent chance of
earning. 95 If, because of § 162(m), the parties agree to a $1,000,000 salary plus
$1,500,000 bonus structure (rather than $1,500,000 of salary), then the
executive is made whole because she is fully grossed up to account for the
additional risk, and the corporation bears the entire brunt of the § 162(m)
wedge.9 6 If, instead, the parties agree to a $1,000,000 salary plus $1,000,000
bonus structure, then the executive bears the entire burden of the § 162(m)
wedge because she has received no gross up for the additional risk. If the
parties agree to a bonus amount between $1,000,000 and $1,500,000, then the
parties will have shared the burden of the § 162(m) wedge through a partial
gross up.
While the statutory (i.e., nominal) incidence of § 162(m) falls on the firm
because the provision denies the deduction for "excess" compensationincreasing the firm's labor costs-the economic incidence depends on the
relative elasticities of the supply of and the demand for individuals capable of
leading public companies. The literature suggests that, under an arm's length
model, at least some of the burden of the § 162(m) wedge will be borne by the
firm.. 97 If so, the result is that, under the arm's length model, to the extent
§ 162(m) results in substitution, the provision decreases firm value and

93. The two arrangements have the same ex ante market value because the expected value
of the bonus is $500,000, the same amount as the excess salary in the all-salary arrangement.
94. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
95. The bonus portion has an expected value of $750,000. Accordingly, a risk-neutral
individual would choose the bonus so long as the cash compensation option was less than
$750,000.
96. Note, however, that the corporation is still better off than had it paid $1,500,000 of
salary because the after-tax cost of the extra nondeductible $500,000 salary is higher than the
after-tax cost of the deductible incentive compensation with an expected cost of $750,000,
assuming that the corporation's marginal tax rate is in excess of 33.3%.
97. See Halperin et al., supra note 9, at 52-65 (predicting that, as a result of § 162(m),
firm profitability would decline in part because compensation expense would increase to offset
the additional risk placed upon the executive when incentive compensation is substituted for
cash compensation); Murphy, supra note 88, at 739 ("Executives shifting from salaries to
performance-based compensation will demand a premium for bearing more risk, resulting in
higher pay levels.").
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increases executive wealth.98 As discussed below, these perverse effects are
likely even more pronounced under the managerial power model.99
b. Substituting FormulaicBonuses for DiscretionaryBonuses
Because bonuses based on objective formulas are preferred under
§ 162(m), one would expect that companies would consider transforming
discretionary bonus plans into formulaic ones. The cost of this substitution is
that the board of directors loses the ability to make qualitative judgments (i.e.,
judgments not based exclusively on quantitative results, such as accounting
results) about the firm's performance in awarding bonuses. In addition, boards
lose the flexibility to alter bonus amounts to take into account unusual
circumstances, such as war, recession, collapse of a major competitor, etc., that
are beyond the control of the executive.
The loss of this discretion and flexibility must be weighed against the
costs of forfeiting deductions for the bonuses paid. The most obvious cost is
the extra tax owed by the company as a result of the lost deductions for
amounts paid pursuant to the bonus plan. The firm may incur political costs as
well. SEC rules require firms to disclose in their proxy statements the impact
of § 162(m) on their compensation policies. 100 As a result, firms that forfeit
deductions must effectively admit to the public that they are more willing to
forfeit valuable tax deductions than they are to restructure executive
compensation plans.' 0' The public may not appreciate the subtle possibility
that increased board discretion and flexibility might be more valuable than the
cost of the lost deductions.
98. Under the arm's length model, assuming at least part of the § 162(m) burden is placed
on the company through increased executive compensation, firm value is decreased because of
the extra compensation costs. Further, executive wealth is increased because of the risk
premium they receive.
99. See infraPart IV.B (discussing the likely effects under the managerial power model).
100. Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder Lists and Mailing Requests,
Exchange Act Release No. 7032,55 SEC Docket 1352 (Nov. 22,1993) (requiring that a proxy
statement "should in its discussion of executive compensation policies address the registrant's
policy with respect to qualifying compensation paid to its executive officers for deductibility
under § 162(m)").
101. Despite the SEC's rule requiring disclosure of the company's § 162(m) policy, Steven
Balsam has noted that disclosures are sometimes "exceedingly vague" and has suggested that
firms be required to disclose the amount of actual deductions forfeited and the additional taxes
paid by virtue of § 162(m) as a result of the company's compensation practices. See
Effectiveness, supranote 85, at 3. To the extent that disclosures are ineffective in conveying the
true additional cost of excess nonqualified compensation, the political costs of forfeiting
deductions would be reduced.
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If the costs of forfeiting deductions are high, there are two ways that a
board might attempt to ameliorate the loss of flexibility and discretion while
still qualifying bonus arrangements under § 162(m). First, the board could use
objective formulas that err on the high side and then preserve negative
discretion to scale the bonuses back down. One problem with this approach is
that the objective formulas could be perceived by the public as overly generous
despite the fact that the board has the power to reduce the amounts derived
from them.10 2 Second, the board could narrow the range of payouts generated
under an objective plan. This would reduce the impact of unexpected positive
factors (e.g., sudden supply shortage for the goods sold by the company) that
are beyond the control of the executive. Consider, for example, a bonus based
on revenues. If the range of revenue growth that is considered in computing the
bonus is smaller (e.g., 80% to 120% of the target), the effect of unexpected
positive factors will be muted compared to arrangements that use a larger range
(e.g., 80% to 200% of target). 0 3 In fact, empirical data suggest that companies
that qualify their bonus arrangements use a narrower range of payouts as
compared to companies that do not qualify their bonus plans.'°4
3. Deduction Forfeiture
Because circumvention and substitution may be costly, corporations in
certain circumstances may simply choose to not comply with § 162(m) and
thereby forfeit deductions for compensation in excess of $1,000,000. For
example, consider the example described above where parties are considering
whether to restructure a $1,500,000 all cash arrangement into a $1,000,000
cash plus $1,500,000 bonus (50% likelihood of payment) arrangement. The
executive demands the extra $250,000 of expected bonus value so as to offset
102.

Recall that, to qualify compensation arrangements under § 162(m), the material terms

of arrangements must be disclosed to (and approved by) shareholders. Supra notes 37-39 and
accompanying text. The Treasury regulations interpreting the disclosure requirement have been
criticized for not requiring the disclosure of sufficiently detailed information. See supra note
85. To the extent this criticism is valid, the risk of public outrage may not be a significant
constraint on using this approach.

103.

The lower end of the range usually will not fall below 80% because that is the lowest

performance level that boards feel can justify a bonus from a public relations perspective. See
Reitenga et al., supra note 63, at 2 n.2 (discussing the 80/120 convention).
104. Reitenga et al. found that the rate of earnings smoothing is higher with respect to
companies that qualify their plans under § 162(m). Id. at 2. They argue that this is consistent
with narrower ranges of bonuses, which "result in a greater penalty for extreme negative
performance and a smaller reward for extreme positive performance." Id. This increases the
incentive to smooth earnings, which is consistent with their empirical findings.
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the additional risk to her under the restructured arrangement. In such a
scenario, if the firm's marginal tax rate is 30%, the firm should choose to forfeit
the deduction by paying $1,500,000 cash. 0 5 If so, the after-tax cost to the firm
of the extra $500,000 cash payment is equal to the pre-tax cost of $500,000
because the compensation deduction is denied. 0 6 If, alternatively, the firm
pays $1,000,000 in cash and a $1,500,000 bonus (with a 50% likelihood of
payment), 0 7 the expected after-tax cost of the bonus is $525,000 (expected
value of $750,000 reduced by the 30% tax deduction). Under these
circumstances, forfeiting the deduction makes sense because the tax benefit of
the deduction is more than offset by the additional payment that the executive
requires because of her risk-aversion.
Nevertheless, there may be political reasons why a firm might choose not
to forfeit deductions even in instances when it would make financial sense to do
so. As noted above, the impact of § 162(m) on executive compensation
policies must be disclosed.10 8 As a result, the public might perceive deduction
forfeiture as suggesting that boards are captured by management. By allowing
the firm to forfeit deductions, the board implies that it is more interested in
appeasing management (by not forcing them to accept pay that is more sensitive
to performance) than in preserving valuable tax deductions. The public likely
will not appreciate that deduction forfeiture might in fact be the best way for
the company to minimize its after-tax compensation costs.
A recent empirical study suggests that firms are behaving as expected
under the arm's length model.10 9 Firms with a riskier business environment
105. This analysis assumes that the entire economic incidence falls on the firm (i.e., that the
executive receives a full gross up for risk). It also assumes that there are no political costs
associated with forfeiting deductions. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the
possibility of political costs).
106. The after-tax cost of the first $1,000,000 is $700,000 because it reduces corporate
taxable income by $1,000,000; accordingly, the payment reduces corporate tax liability by
$300,000 ($1,000,000 x 30%).
107. Recall that the executive would require this arrangement in order to offset the addition
risk to which she is subject as a result of the restructuring.
108. Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder Lists and Mailing Requests,
Exchange Act Release No. 7032, 55 SEC Docket 1352 (Nov. 22, 1993) (requiring that a proxy
statement "should in its discussion of executive compensation policies address the registrant's
policy with respect to qualifying compensation paid to its executive officers for deductibility
under § 162(m)"). As noted above, however, it has been argued that these disclosures are
sometimes vague and of little help in determining the amount of deductions lost and the
resulting increased tax liability. See supra note 101. To the extent disclosures are not
completely effective, the political cost of forfeiting deductions would be reduced.
109. Steven Balsam & Qin J. Yin, ExplainingFirm Willingness to Forfeit Tax Deductions
Under InternalRevenue Code § 162(m): The Million Dollar Cap, 24 J. ACcT. & PUB. POL'Y
300, 322-23 (2005).
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were more likely to forfeit deductions, presumably because substitution was
more costly." 0 When the tax benefit of deductions is higher and when the
firm's compensation practices are subject to greater public scrutiny, firms are
more likely to preserve their deductions."'
4. DirectorIndependence and ShareholderApproval Requirements
Section 162(m) appears to create incentives for strengthening corporate
governance procedures because, in order to qualify as performance-based under
§ 162(m), compensation must be approved both by an independent
compensation committee and by a shareholder vote. 12 Under an arm's length
model, however, there would be no need for enhanced corporate governance
procedures because the market would balance the benefits and burdens of these
procedures, ultimately resulting in the procedure that maximizes firm value.
States would compete for corporate charters by creating default governance
rules that are optimal. If the default rules happened to be suboptimal in a
particular context, then firms would opt out and voluntarily require enhanced
procedures in order to best attract capital.
In fact, states have taken a hands-off posture when it comes to procedures3
relating to the setting and structuring of executive compensation."
Furthermore, companies themselves generally have not opted out of these
laissez-faire default rules. 14 Under the arm's length model, therefore, the
director independence and shareholder vote requirement is unnecessary, serving
only to impose additional costs on companies who choose to qualify their plans.
5. Effect on Nonaffected Firms
Under the arm's length model, firms whose base compensation
arrangements for covered executives are set well below $1,000,000 should be
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2000) (setting forth approval requirements).
113. See Bainbridge, supra note 50, at 1650-52 (discussing the "rational apathy" by the
states).
114. The exceptions are the recently enacted New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
rules regulating the corporate procedures for setting executive compensation, which companies
on the respective exchanges are required to adopt. NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.05(a) (2004); Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 81
SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003).
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unaffected by § 162(m). Because § 162(m) does not apply to them, these firms
do not have to use circumvention or substitution techniques to preserve
deductions. However, empirical data generated by Harris and Livingstone
suggests that § 162(m) has in fact caused these firms' compensation costs to
increase," 5 which seems to be consistent with the result that would be expected
under the managerial power model. Because Congress has arguably set a
benchmark of $1,000,000 for base compensation, § 162(m) may be used by
complicit directors to deflect public outrage over salary arrangements at or
below that amount.
Interestingly, Harris and Livingstone view their results from the opposite
perspective. Harris and Livingstone view negative publicity regarding
executive compensation as an "implicit contracting cost," defined as a "noncontractual cost that third parties [here, the public,] impose on firms by reacting
adversely to firms' behaviors."" 16 The critical assumption made by Harris and
Livingstone is that paying additional compensation always generates firm
revenues in excess of the cost of the additional compensation, an assumption
that would be inconsistent with either a pure arm's length view or the
managerial power view. 17 Harris and Livingstone thus assume that publicity is
an obstacle that undermines the ability of firms to structure executive
Harris and
compensation arrangements that maximize firm value.
Livingstone's results (i.e., that unaffected firms increased their executive
compensation as a result of § 162(m)) would be consistent with results that
would be expected under the arm's length view1 8in a world where publicity is an
obstacle to shareholder wealth maximization.
6. Conclusion Under the Arm's Length Model
Under the arm's length model, § 162(m) simply imposes an additional cost
on the parties in compensating executives because, in the absence of§ 162(m),
115. David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit
ContractingCost Benchmark: The Definition ofExcessive Executive Compensation, 77 ACCT.
REv. 997, 1014 (2002).
116. Id.at 998.
117. Under a pure arm's length view, the firm would pay additional compensation to the
point where the additional revenues equaled the amount of additional compensation. Under the
managerial power model, the firm would pay additional compensation until the risk of negative
publicity was too great, even if the cost of additional compensation was greater than the
revenues generated by it.
118. In contrast, Bebchuk and Fried's managerial power model predicts that publicity of
compensation practices increases shareholder wealth. See generally BEBcHUCK& FRIED, supra
note 6.

64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (2007)

the parties would have negotiated the optimal compensation arrangement. With
respect to this deadweight loss, two issues arise. First, what is the size of the
loss? Second, how is its burden shared between the firm and the executive?
The size of the deadweight loss depends on how the parties respond to
§ 162(m). The parties could avoid the provision by providing for mandatory
deferral or easy-to-reach bonus structures. Alternatively, the parties could
substitute qualified compensation components (e.g., options, formulaic
bonuses) for nonqualified compensation components (e.g., salaries,
discretionary bonuses). Finally, the parties could simply continue their existing
compensation arrangements, thereby causing the company to lose deductions
for compensation in excess of $1,000,000.
Each of these strategies comes with associated costs, resulting in the
deadweight loss. For example, mandatory deferral imposes firm insolvency
risk and illiquidity costs on the executive, while substitution inefficiently
imposes greater risk on the executive, the more risk-averse party. The extent of
these costs is dependent on a variety of factors." 9 Under the arm's length view,
the parties would choose the strategy that imposes the smallest cost, after taking
into account the particular circumstances.
Though the nominal burden of § 162(m)'s deadweight loss might be
placed on one party, part or all of the economic incidence may in fact be borne
by the other. For example, if the strategy of mandatory deferral is utilized, the
nominal burden is on the executive because she bears additional firm
insolvency risk and the burden of illiquidity. However, the parties could shift
that burden to the company by simply paying the executive a greater amount to
offset these costs. Likewise, though the burden of deduction forfeiture is
nominally on the company because its tax burden is higher, the company could
shift the burden (in whole or in part) to the executive by paying her a lower
amount than it would have paid in the absence of § 162(m). The economic
incidence of § 162(m), therefore, depends on the relative bargaining power of
the company and the executive.
In summary, under the arm's length view, § 162(m) imposes a cost that is
borne by the parties. Unless all of the cost is shifted to the executive (either in
the form of lower compensation or increased risk-bearing by the executive
without any compensation), which the literature suggests is an unlikely
scenario, 120 § 162(m) reduces shareholder wealth. Furthermore, to the extent
incentive compensation is substituted for cash compensation, the wealth of
119. The factors include the executive's liquidity and level of risk-aversion and the firm's
solvency, level of business risk, marginal tax rate, and level of public scrutiny.
120. See supra note 97-99 and accompanying text.
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executives is increased because of the risk premium they receive. Both results
under the arm's length view2 1are inconsistent with the intent of Congress to
increase shareholder value.1
B. ManagerialPower Model
Adherents of the managerial power model argue that directors and
management collude to reduce the political costs of overpaying
management. Under this view, would § 162(m) improve expected
outcomes?
It is important to note at the outset that the statutory incidence of the
§ 162(m) penalty is placed on the company because, without any
restructuring of compensation arrangements, the company's tax liability
would be increased. 2 2 Therefore, to shift any part of the economic
incidence to the executive, collective action must be taken by parties. For
example, cash compensation must be deferred or substituted into incentive
compensation, bonus arrangements must be restructured, or compensation
levels must simply be reduced; otherwise, the company loses deductions
and pays more tax. As an initial matter, adherents of the managerial power
model would be skeptical that actions taken to preserve deductions would
effectively shift the incidence of the burden created by § 162(m). They
would likely be even more skeptical that any actions taken would actually
make the shareholders better off than they would have been in the absence
of § 162(m).
This skepticism results from two intuitions. First, recall that under the
managerial power model, the only meaningful constraint on executive
compensation levels is the risk of public outrage. In the absence of any
changed circumstances, therefore, one would expect executive pay levels
and structures to remain somewhat sticky. 2 3 Drastic changes, without any
121. Put differently, under the arm's length view, there is no market failure and,
accordingly, firms and executives make the optimum trade-off between incentive generation and
risk preferences. Introducing § 162(m) into the mix upsets this tradeoff to the detriment of the
parties. Unless the entirety of the detriment is borne by executives, the firm is worse off after
the enactment of § 162(m) under the arm's length model.
122. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2000) (denying public companies a deduction for
nonqualified compensation in excess of $1,000,000 paid to a covered employee).
123. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 75 (noting this stickiness); Iman Anabtawi,
Overlooked Alternatives in the Pay Without Performance Debate 39-43 (Jan. 2005) (UCLA
School of Law unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (suggesting that path dependence
limits the flexibility in designing alternative compensation structures).
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apparent rationale, would be more likely to trigger public scrutiny and
criticism. The enactment of § 162(m) provides an excuse for the colluding
parties to engage in significant restructuring of compensation arrangements
all in the name of preserving corporate deductions. Section 162(m), thus,
may create the opportunity for management to extract even more rents.
Second, § 162(m) provides an excuse for the parties to substitute
incentive compensation for cash. As explained in detail below, for a
variety of reasons, the values of incentive compensation components are
likely less salient to outsiders than commensurate levels of cash
compensation. 124 Accordingly, the managerial power model would predict
that § 162(m) increases executive compensation levels beyond the amount
necessary simply to offset the executive's additional exposure to risk,
resulting in a windfall for the executive.
Anecdotal evidence supports these intuitions. It is widely believed
that § 162(m) contributed significantly to the explosion of compensatory
stock options that began in the late 1990s.1 25 Section 162(m) provided an
excuse to drastically change compensation structures to shift heavily
towards stock options, the value of which is harder to appreciate than cash
compensation. 126
124. See infra Part IV.B.2.
125. See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Options Backdating:
Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 2 (Sept. 6,
2006), http://banking.senate.gov/_files/ACFB067.pdf(on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) ("[O]ne of the most significant reasons that non-salary forms of compensation have
ballooned since the early 1990s is the $1 million legislative cap on salaries for certain top public
company executives.... ."); James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align
Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 697, 709 (1997) ("[A]necdotal
evidence suggests, however, that management is now happily complying [with § 162(m)] by
awarding itself excessive amounts of stock options."); Schizer, supranote 52, at 468 (suggesting
that "the explosion of option grants is evidence that [§ 162(m)] backfired (or was never intended
to work)"); Press Release, Fin. Economists Roundtable, Statement of the Financial Economists
Roundtable on "The Controversy Over Executive Compensation" (Nov. 24,2003), availableat
www.luc.edu/orgs/finroundtable/statement03.pdf (suggesting that the increased use of stock
options during the 1990s was attributable in part to § 162(m)); Press Release, Senator Chuck
Grassley (Sept. 6, 2006) (on file with author) (stating that § 162(m) "seems to have encouraged
the options culture"). Whether the attribution of the growth in options to § 162(m) is supported
by empirical evidence is not entirely clear. See Lora Cicconi, Blaming the Tax Code for the
Backdating Scandal, 114 TAx NoTEs 1129, 1140 (March 19, 2007) (analyzing the empirical
evidence and concluding that while there is no question that options growth has been
exponential, "it is not nearly as clear that the explosion of options compensation is the result of
§ 162(m)").
126. See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty in valuing
compensatory stock options and the possibility that the public does not fully appreciate the time
value component of the option).
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1. Avoidance

As discussed above, one relatively easy avoidance strategy would be to
require executives to defer receipt of excess cash compensation until they
retire. The amount ultimately paid would include an investment yield to
account for the fact that the compensation will be paid in the future. If the
investment return that the company gives to executives is a reasonable after-tax
rate of return, this strategy would put the parties in the same general economic
position that they would have occupied in the absence of § 162(m), assuming
27
that executive illiquidity costs and firm insolvency risk are not significant.
However, Bebchuk and Fried argue that deferred compensation arrangements
typically provide for a market rate of return that is derived on a pre-tax basis,
making the equivalent after-tax rate significantly higher. 28 If so, deferring the
compensation is more expensive than paying current compensation and,
Bebchuk and Fried argue, this fact is not adequately disclosed to
shareholders. 129 Accordingly, deferring cash compensation in excess of
$1,000,000, while preserving deductibility under § 162(m), may exacerbate an
existing transparency problem. Section 162(m) also may provide an excuse
(i.e., to preserve the company's tax deductions) for companies to continue to
offer overly generous rates of return in order to encourage executives to defer
compensation.
Another circumvention strategy would be to use bonuses with easy-toreach targets in lieu of cash compensation. However, because the material
terms of the bonus arrangement must be disclosed to shareholders, the
possibility exists that bonus terms will result in public outrage. 30 If so, this
127.
128.

See supra note 77.
BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 6, at 104-05.

129. See id.
at 105-06 (stating that outsiders cannot easily observe the economic impact of
deferred compensation packages). The new SEC regulations requiring enhanced disclosure address
this lack of transparency to some extent. While all earnings on deferred compensation must now be
disclosed in a Nonqualified Deferred Compensation table, only "above-market" or "preferential"
earnings must be disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table, which is the principal disclosure
vehicle for executive compensation. SEC Press Release No. 2006-123, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive Compensation
and Related Matters (July 26, 2006), availableat www.sec.gov/press/2006/2006-123.htm. In
determining whether a yield on deferred compensation is above-market or preferential, the yield is
compared to a benchmark that is determined on a pre-tax basis. See id. As a result, the Summary
Compensation Table will not reflect the tax cost to the firm (nor the tax benefit to the executive)
associated with nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. See id.
130. See supranotes 37-39 and accompanying text (describing the disclosure and shareholder
approval requirements for compensation to qualify under § 162(m)). Whether in practice these
disclosures adequately inform shareholders of their material terms is unclear. See supra note 86.
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would shine a spotlight on the executive pay practices of the firm, which would
be counterproductive for managers and board members under the managerial
power model.
2. Substitution Effect
If cash compensation is substituted with more risky incentive
compensation, the first question is whether the manager will be fully grossed up
for the additional risk that she is taking on.13 ' If so, the entire burden of
§ 162(m) is borne by the company, while the manager is indifferent to the
effect of § 162(m). 132 A second question is whether the manager will actually
be better off (on a risk-adjusted basis) than she would have been in the absence
of § 162(m) because the value of the gross up exceeds the burden of the extra
risk. In that case, the company is even worse off because of § 162(m), while
133
the manager receives a § 162(m) windfall.
There are two reasons to suspect that § 162(m) would result in an
executive windfall under the managerial power model. Recall that under the
managerial power model, the only meaningful constraint on executive
compensation is the risk of public outrage. The enactment of § 162(m) might
reduce the risk of public outrage over unduly generous compensation
arrangements for two primary reasons. First, the enactment might negate the
stickiness inherent in executive pay norms, providing an excuse for drastic
restructuring that would, in the absence of any external stimulus, generate
public scrutiny. 134 Companies could now justify their decisions to revamp
executive compensation arrangements as actions taken to preserve their
valuable tax deductions.
Second, § 162(m) likewise provides an excuse for companies to alter the
mix of compensation towards components whose value is less conspicuous to
outsiders. As previously discussed, qualified compensation includes primarily
131. Recall that, because of various constraints on the ability of executives to effectively
hedge against the additional risk, this Article ignores the possibility of executive hedging
strategies. Supra note 52.
132. This is the full gross up for risk scenario explained above. See supra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text. In such a case, § 162(m) reduces shareholder wealth and increases
management wealth, an effect opposite to that intended by Congress. Nevertheless, due to
management's risk aversion, management would be no better off under § 162(m).
133. In such a case, management would prefer the increased amount of incentive
compensation over the value of fixed compensation that would have been payable in the absence
of § 162(m).
134. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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stock options and formulaic-based bonuses. The transparency of the value of
each of these types of incentive pay will be considered in turn.
Compensatory stock options are notoriously difficult to value even by
financial experts in light of their vesting restrictions, their relatively long terms,
and the risk-averseness of executives.135 Furthermore, until very recently, the
value of executive stock options was generally not recorded as a compensation
expense on the company's income statement, but instead was required to be
reported for information purposes only in the statement's footnotes. 36 In
addition, the value of at-the-money stock options (the type of options that
qualify under § 162(m)) 137 is likely not nearly as salient to the public as an
equivalent value of cash. These options have no so-called "intrinsic value" at
grant because there is no spread between exercise price and existing fair market
value. Thus, if the options were exercised immediately, the holder would
receive nothing. Nevertheless, these options still often have significant value at
grant because they allow the holder to participate in share price gains without
the necessity of putting any capital at risk.' 38 This benefit, referred to as the
option privilege, increases as the volatility of the underlying stock increases and
as the term of the option increases.1 39 It is likely that the public simply focuses
on the lack of intrinsic value in executive
options and neglects to consider fully
40
the value of the option privilege.
This notion is supported anecdotally by the fact that public uproar over
options inevitably occurs upon exercise rather than upon grant. In other words,
the public focuses on the intrinsic value of options at the time of exercise (the
ex post value of the option) instead of the value of the option privilege at the
time of grant (the ex ante value of the option). This focus is misplaced,
however, in assessing the propriety of executive compensation amounts
because the ex post value of the option includes not only the original
compensatory element (i.e., the ex ante value) but also the investment yield
thereon. In assessing executive pay structures, only the compensatory element
ought to be considered.
135. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 18-20 (April 1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
136.

See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING

STANDARDS No. 123, at 1 (2004).
137. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing the qualification
requirements for stock options under § 162(m)).
138. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(3) (1996) (describing the option privilege).
139. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 555-57 (5th ed. 1999).
140. Cf BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 162 (arguing that granting in-the-money
options would likely increase public outrage costs for directors and executives).
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Another difficulty in understanding the value of option grants relates to
the prospect that the board will reprice or refresh the options in the event of a
significant reduction in stock valuation. Repricing involves the resetting of an
exercise price down to current fair market value.' 4' Refreshing is the granting
of additional at-the-money options after a stock price drop, in lieu of
repricing.142 If an informal agreement or understanding exists that, in the event
of significant stock value depreciation, the board will reprice or refresh
options,
43
then the option values reported by companies will be understated.
One final problem in valuing options involves the issue of spring-loading,
the term used to refer to the practice of granting options just ahead of the
release of favorable nonpublic information. While these options are technically
issued with at-the-money strike prices, because of the spring-loaded feature, the
options are in substance in-the-money at the time of grant. Accordingly, the
real value of spring-loaded options reported to shareholders in the company's
financial statements will be understated because it will be based on the trading
value of the stock, which will not have fully incorporated the impact of the yetto-be-released favorable news.144
Turning now to formula-based bonuses, if they are substituted for cash
compensation, a similar reduction in transparency may occur. At the time the
bonus arrangements are implemented, relevant outsiders may not be able to
appreciate the expected cost of complicated bonus formulas. And when bonus
141. Formal repricing, once quite popular, is much less common since adverse accounting
rules were promulgated in late 1998. See N.K. Chidambaran & Nagpumanand R. Prabhala, The
Fall of ESO Repricing: Governance Reform or Reform Gone Awry? 1 (2005) (unpublished
working paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://www.
rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/prabhala/wpapers/repricing_2.pdf (noting the decline in formal
repricing).
142. See id. at 2 (concluding that, as a result of the adverse accounting rule promulgated in
1998 with regard to repricing, many companies chose to refresh options in lieu of repricing, to
the detriment of the firm); id. at 30 ("Stopping repricing did not stop the flow of compensation
when options go underwater, but merely shifted the vehicle for conveying compensation ....
[A] popular choice used in lieu of repricing, viz., refresher grants, is inferior and imposes
deadweight costs that benefit neither the firms' shareholders nor its employees .... [T]hese
costs.., can be quite significant for heavy users of options.").
143. See Repetti, supranote 125, at 709 (noting the problem of repricing under § 162(m)).
144. A similar transparency problem occurs when options are backdated, a phenomenon
that has received a great deal of recent attention. See Ciconni, supra note 125, at 1130-32
(describing the backdating scandal). When options are backdated, their true value is
understated. See generally David I. Walker, Some Observations on the Stock Option
Backdating Scandal of 2006 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 06-31, 2006),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=929702 (noting that the common thread among
springloading, backdating, repricing, and refreshing is that option design can somewhat easily
be manipulated to surreptitiously transfer value to executives).
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payouts are actually made, while outsiders will certainly be able to appreciate
the cost at that time, boards can justify the large payments by noting that the
amounts were derived from objective performance-based arrangements
previously approved by shareholders.
Furthermore, if at the time the bonus arrangements are structured, an
implied understanding exists that bonus targets will be re-set in the event of
poor firm performance. Even though bonuses paid pursuant to the re-set plan
would be nondeductible under § 162(m), the apparent cost of the formulaic
1 45
bonus structures at inception will be understated relative to actual value.
This is analogous to the transparency problems associated with repricing or
refreshing of options.
In addition, like stock options, formulaic bonuses can be spring loaded.
At the time the bonuses are structured, the board and management could be
aware of nonpublic information that would significantly increase the chances of
achieving the relevant bonus targets. As a result, the real value of the bonus
arrangements would be hidden from outsiders.
Finally, consider the impact of bonus structures that involve negative
discretion. Recall that the parties could structure generous objective bonus
formulas, with the board retaining the discretion to reduce the amounts derived
from the formulas. At the outset, boards might justify these arrangements by
emphasizing their ability to use negative discretion. Boards could argue that
such arrangements allow the board to preserve deductions under § 162(m)
while retaining the ability to take into account relevant qualitative facts and
circumstances in deciding how best to compensate management. However,
when the time comes to use the negative discretion to scale down the award, the
board, because of its cozy relationship with management, decides against it.
The board can then justify its decision by noting that the bonus payment
46
formula was performance-based and previously approved by shareholders. 1
145. See Jesse Drucker, As CEOs Miss Bonus Goals, GoalpostsMove-CompaniesAdjust
Target Levels, Keeping Their Executives Happy; IRS Pay-CurbIncentives Ignored,WALL ST.J.,
July 7, 2004, at C1 (describing the prevalence of bonus re-setting).
146. One prominent practitioner suggests that this scenario is not atypical:
Because boards had to formulate and give shareholders a range of awards based on
future results, they typically included at the high end amounts far in excess of
anything previously paid, against the possibility that the CEO or other top
executives reached extreme stretch goals or otherwise "shot the lights out." This is
what happened: when, at the end of the measuring period, the board has to decide
how much to award, it invariably moved toward, or in some cases, to the top, ofthe
range approved by shareholders.
Bevis Longstreth, A Real World Critiqueof Pay Without Performance, 30 J. CORP. L. 767, 769
(2005); see also Murphy, supra note 88, at 739 (suggesting that, in the case of negative
discretion bonus arrangements, "compensation committees will avoid imposing meaningful
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In other words, negative discretion bonus arrangements can implicitly shift
the burden of proof with regard to large bonus grants. For example, assume a
bonus award of $10,000,000. If the bonus were purely discretionary, the board
would likely be required to justify in some detail, at the time it is awarded, how
it arrived at such a large number. On the other hand, if the $10,000,000 was
initially derived objectively, the amount could be viewed as having some
presumption of validity. If so, the board will not be required to justify the
$10,000,000 amount as vigorously as in the discretionary bonus context.
In summary, the enactment of § 162(m) negated the stickiness inherent in
executive compensation norms and provided an excuse for companies to use
compensation structures whose true values are harder to appreciate for a variety
of reasons. 47 Under the managerial power model, this combination would
result in an increase in executive pay beyond that necessary merely to offset the
additional risk placed upon executives. Executives would receive a § 162(m)
windfall.
3. Deduction Forfeiture
As previously noted, SEC rules require that companies disclose the impact
of § 162(m) on their compensation policies. Accordingly, a company's
decision to forfeit substantial deductions may draw public scrutiny.' 48 Relevant
outsiders may perceive that decision as one that elevates the manager's interest
over the shareholders. By forfeiting deductions, it appears that the board is
more willing to increase the company's tax liability than to force executives to
accept pay structures that are sensitive to firm performance. In fact, as
discussed above, in certain circumstances it may be rational for firms to forfeit
of restructuring compensation
deductions rather than incur the additional costs
49
162(m).1
§
circumventing
or
arrangements

[negative] discretionary... and [accordingly] total bonuses will drift up to the 'upper bound'
specified by the formula").
147. In addition to the opacity of the substituted compensation components, these
components may be more plausibly justified to outsiders because they have the appearance of
enhancing firm value by aligning incentives. David Walker has argued that, under the
managerial power theory, the extent to which compensation components can be plausibly
justified is significant. See David I. Walker, The Manager'sShare, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV.
587, 635 (2005) ("The more opaque and/or plausibly justifiable the transfer [wealth from firm to
executive], the less the outrage, and the greater the value appropriation via that channel.").
148. But see supranote 101 (noting that whether the required disclosures are fully effective
is unclear).
149. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing deduction forfeiture).

CONTROLLING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Under the managerial power model, it would seem that boards would be
loath to forfeit deductions--even though doing so might be efficient-because
of the potential negative public response. By appearing to favor executive
interests over the company's, deduction forfeiture would have the potential to
increase public scrutiny of compensation practices. Furthermore, as described
above, § 162(m) provides an excuse to restructure compensation arrangements
in ways that could allow for even more abusive compensation practices. It
would seem that, under the managerial power model, boards and managers
would use § 162(m) as cover to do so (i.e., "we, as diligent directors and
managers, are restructuring compensation arrangements to preserve deductions
and help the company"). If they simply forfeited deductions, they might miss
the opportunity to negate the stickiness inherent in executive compensation
norms. 150 For these reasons, the managerial power model would predict that it
would be rare for firms (particularly high-profile ones) to forfeit significant
amounts of deductions.
4. DirectorIndependence and ShareholderApproval Requirements
In order to qualify incentive compensation under § 162(m), the
arrangements must be approved both by independent directors and by
shareholders after adequate disclosure.' 5 ' These conditions, at first glance,
might appear quite beneficial under the managerial power view. Independent
directors would presumably be much less susceptible to management influence.
And the shareholder approval requirement should result in increased
transparency of executive compensation arrangements and greater director
accountability to shareholders.
Nevertheless, managerial power adherents are skeptical about the
magnitude of the benefit of § 162(m)'s approval requirements. While Bebchuk
and Fried note that independent director measures may be somewhat beneficial,
52
they also emphasize a number of factors that undermine their effectiveness.1
Chief among them is the fact that even though "[t]he CEO and his or her
director allies may not fully control board nominations in the future... [,]
remaining on good terms with them is likely to continue to increase a director's

150. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing the stickiness of executive pay
structures).
151. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(B) (2000).
152. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supranote 6, at 202-04 (discussing the limits of independent
director requirements).
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chances of being renominated. '' 53 Furthermore, Bebchuk and Fried note that
"[a]s long as directors are supposed to act collegially and feel like part of a team
of which the CEO is for many purposes the leader, they will feel
5 4 more
comfortable accommodating his or her wishes than opposing them."'
With respect to the shareholder disclosure and approval condition,
Bebchuk and Fried are even less sanguine.155 They point to the fact that
disclosures are generally broadly worded, leaving directors with substantial
discretion. 156 More importantly, according to Bebchuk and Fried, "even though
shareholders can collectively veto the [proffered compensation structure], they
will have little control over how executives are compensated if they turn down
the plan proposed by the board.' 5 7 As a result, the board could simply replace
the rejected plan with one that is even worse for shareholders. For example, if
the shareholders fail to approve an otherwise qualified § 162(m) arrangement,
the board could unilaterally approve a different plan that is not qualified under
§ 162(m), thereby costing the firm valuable tax deductions.
Furthermore, as described above, the shareholder approval requirements
might actually result in increased management compensation. 158 When
incentive arrangements are proposed, shareholders may not fully appreciate
their value for a variety of reasons. And, as Bebchuk and Fried suggest,
shareholders may feel that they have little choice but to approve the
arrangements to preserve the company's tax deductions.' 5 9 Then, when
amounts are paid out under the incentive arrangement, large payments can be
justified by noting that the amounts paid are "performance-based" under plans
previously disclosed to and approved by shareholders.
5. Effect on Nonaffected Finns
Section 162(m) could also adversely affect shareholders of nonaffected
firms (i.e., those public companies whose cash compensation to covered
153. Id. at 203.
154. Id. at 203-04.
155. See generally id.at 196-97. Though Bebchuk and Fried focus their discussion here
on the shareholder approval of equity-based plans, their concerns should apply equally to
formula-based bonus arrangements.
156. See id. at 196.
157. See id.at 197.
158. See supraPart IV.B.2.
159. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 197 (noting that if shareholders vote down a
proposed compensation arrangement, "they have little assurance that the board will not instead
adopt arrangements that may be even worse for shareholders").
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executives is well below $1,000,000). The $1,000,000 threshold could be
viewed as a congressionally sanctioned norm for cash compensation. If so, it
would provide political cover for nonaffected firms to increase their cash
compensation levels to approach $1,000,000. The managerial power model
would predict that the enactment of § 162(m) would result in increased
compensation for managers of nonaffected firms to the detriment of their
shareholders.

There is both anecdotal

60

and empirical' 61 support for this

hypothesis.
6. Symbolic Value of§ 162(m)
Under the managerial power model, one possible salutary effect of
§ 162(m) is that it shined a bright light on executive compensation practices.
By enacting § 162(m), Congress has warned the public that boards and
executives must be carefully watched. By favoring compensation structures
negotiated by independent compensation committees, Congress identified board
capture by management as a significant problem. And, simply by legislating in
this area, Congress indicates a willingness to intervene in the
company/executive relationship if boards and managers fail to clean up their
act. These symbolic effects could be beneficial even if, considering its
subtleties and nuance, the statute suffers from technical design flaws. 162 Under
the managerial power model, where perception is more important than reality,
the symbolic impact of § 162(m) could be more significant than these flaws.
7. Conclusion Under the ManagerialPower Model
Under the managerial power model, the enactment of§ 162(m) may result
in increased overall management compensation for two interrelated reasons.
First, the enactment would negate the stickiness or path dependence of
executive compensation norms. In the absence of changed circumstances, it
160. See, e.g., John A. Byme, That's Some Pay Cap, Bill, Bus. WK., Apr. 25,1994, at 57
(suggesting that the cap has effectively established the standard for executive pay).
161. See Harris & Livingstone, supra note 115, at 1.
162. Cf Michael S. Kirsch, The CongressionalResponse to CorporateExpatriations: The
Tension Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of MultinationalCorporations,24 VA.
TAx REv. 475, 507-43 (2005) (analyzing Congress's responses to the perceived problem of
corporate expatriations and concluding that, while the technical design of the responses were
flawed, there may have been salutary symbolic effects stemming from congressional attention to
the issue).
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would be difficult for the board and management to defend drastic deviations
from their existing pay arrangements. Second, the enactment of § 162(m)
provides the excuse to implement such deviations in favor of pay structures that
are preferred under the provision. The values of these pay preferred structures
are less salient to outsiders and more manipulable by insiders, resulting in
probable gains for executives.
Under this model, therefore, shareholders would likely be worse off and
executives better off after the enactment of § 162(m). The substitution of
qualified components for nonqualified ones would result in an increase in
executive pay beyond the amount necessary to offset the additional risk placed
upon the executive as a result of the substitution. If so, the harm to
shareholders under the managerial power model would be greater than that
under the arm's length model. Furthermore, executives receive a windfall
under the managerial power model, unlike in the arm's length model where
executives would generally be indifferent to the effect of § 162(m).
On the other hand, it is possible that § 162(m) could act as a constraint on
executive compensation levels and structures under the managerial power
model. By preferring compensation negotiated by independent compensation
committees, the provision could result in better bargaining by directors on
behalf of shareholders, although managerial power proponents are generally not
optimistic about the benefits of independent director requirements. Perhaps
more significantly, § 162(m) might have substantial symbolic value under this
model, where public perception of compensation practices is critical.
V. EmpiricalStudies
Under the arm's length model, § 162(m) simply creates a burden that is
borne by the company and the executive. The incidence of this burden is a
function of the parties' bargain and could be shared in a variety of ways. For
example, the executive could be subject to additional unwanted risk without
164
adequate compensation163 or the company could forfeit some deductions.
Regardless of how the burden is divvied up, it is clear that, under this model,
§ 162(m) would fail to meet its objectives.
163. As discussed above, the executive could bear part or all of the burden of § 162(m) in
other ways. The executive could be forced to defer compensation or, more simply, to accept a
lower value of compensation.
164. There are other ways in which the company could bear part or all of the § 162(m)
burden. The company could compensate the executive for the additional risk imposed upon him
by virtue of the substitution of qualified compensation for cash compensation or for the burden
resulting from the executive's deferral of compensation.
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The analysis is significantly more complex under the managerial power
view. On the one hand, the introduction of § 162(m) gives the parties an
excuse to drastically depart from existing executive compensation norms and to
utilize executive compensation components whose true values are harder for
relevant outsiders to appreciate. On the other hand, by enacting the provision,
Congress highlighted the agency problems inherent in executive compensation.
These two effects push in opposite directions under the managerial power
model, and it is impossible to predict which is stronger. This section considers
the existing empirical research regarding the effect of § 162(m) on executive
pay packages following its enactment in 1993.
A. Levels of Executive Compensation
1. Affected Firms
Several studies have found that the compensation of executives of
"affected firms" (i.e., those whose executives earned at or near the $1,000,000
threshold) increased after § 162(m)'s enactment. 65 These studies also found
that, while all components of executive pay packages increased, the increase in
stock options was the largest.
The overall increase in executive pay is theoretically consistent with both
models under certain assumptions. Under the arm's length model, risk-averse
executives would receive larger amounts of compensation to offset the
additional unwanted risk foisted upon them. 166 Under the managerial power
view, the increase in overall pay could result from § 162(m)'s stickiness
negation and its preference in favor of less transparent pay structures. 167 In
order to draw any additional conclusions, we would need to know whether the
increase in pay is merely sufficient to offset the executive's additional risk
(consistent with the arm's length model) or whether it results in a windfall
gross up (consistent with the managerial power model). This analysis would

165. See generally STEVEN BALSAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
(2002); Balsam & Yin, supra note 109; Todd Perry & Marc Zenner, Payfor Performance?
Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts,62 J. FIN. ECON. 453

(2001); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive
Compensation (1997) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=41780.
166. This assumes that, due to the relative bargaining power of the parties, the company is
required to offset some or all of this additional risk through increased compensation.
167. This assumes that these effects of § 162(m) outweigh its symbolic effects.
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require an evaluation of each executive's level of wealth and risk preferences,
which the studies were not able to do.
2. Unaffected Firms
Harris and Livingstone found that unaffected firms also increased
executive compensation, a result that is generally inconsistent with the arm's
length model.168 The result is, however, consistent with the managerial power
model, suggesting that the enactment of § 162(m) provided political cover for
these firms to increase their nonqualified compensation components to
approach the $1,000,000 "target" set by the provision.
B. SubstitutionEffect
The arm's length model would predict that, unless restructuring costs are
70
high, 169 incentive compensation would be substituted for cash compensation.
As a result, one would expect to find an increase in the sensitivity of executive
pay to firm performance after the enactment of § 162(m) in 1993.17'
On the other hand, under the managerial power model, the impact of
§ 162(m) on pay sensitivity is not as clear. Assuming that the symbolic impact
of § 162(m) is not significant, the provision would be expected to increase
overall executive compensation beyond that necessary to offset the executives'
additional exposure to risk. These windfall gross ups could lead to enhanced
performance sensitivity because the windfall amounts could grow as firm
performance increases. In other words, while most (or all) executives would
receive windfalls, executives at high-performing firms might receive the largest
windfalls, in which case pay sensitivity would increase. Alternatively, the
windfall amounts could be unrelated to firm performance, in which case pay
sensitivity would not increase.
168. As discussed above, the result is consistent with the arm's length model only if one
assumes that before the enactment of § 162(m), unaffected firms were unable to pay their
executives optimally high amounts of compensation because of the possibility of negative
publicity.
169. If restructuring costs are high, then the company may choose to simply forfeit
deductions.
170. This assumes that § 162(m) is not easily avoided through mandatory deferral or easyto-reach bonus structures.
171. Because managers would likely receive a gross up to some extent to offset the
additional risk of the performance-sensitive pay, managers in the aggregate would receive an
overall increase in pay.
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The empirical evidence with regard to changes in pay sensitivity is mixed.
Some researchers have found that pay sensitivity has increased after 1993,72
which is consistent with both the arm's length model and the managerial power
model under certain conditions. 73 However, the latest study concluded that
"[t]here is little evidence that [§ 162(m)] significantly increased the
performance sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay at affected
174
firms."'
This conclusion is consistent with the arm's length model if
(i) restructuring costs are high causing many firms to choose to forfeit
deductions or (ii)many firms are avoiding § 162(m) through mandatory
deferral and/or easy-to-reach bonus structures. The conclusion is also
consistent with the managerial power model if windfall gross up amounts are
not related to firm performance.
C. Deduction Forfeiture
Under the arm's length model, firms would be willing to forfeit deductions
in cases where the costs of substituting performance-based compensation are
higher than the cost of the lost deduction. 175 Under the managerial power
model, firms should be less willing to forfeit deductions for two reasons. First,
boards that forfeit deductions would publicly appear to be favoring executives
at the expense of shareholders. Second, by forfeiting deductions, managers and
boards miss out on the restructuring opportunity handed to them by Congress.
Balsam and Yin examined deduction forfeiture in a recent study. 76 They
found that firms forfeit at least some amount of deductions in 40% of firm-year
observations in their sample. 177 They also found that firms were more likely to
forfeit deductions in cases where recontracting costs were higher and where the
firm's business environment was riskier. 7 8 These findings are consistent with
172. See Balsam & Yin, supra note 109, at 320-21; Perry & Zenner, supra note 165, at
454.
173. The conditions for this conclusion under the arm's length model are: (i) § 162(m) is
not easily avoided and (ii) restructuring costs are not high enough such that deduction forfeiture
is more efficient. The condition for this conclusion under the managerial power model is that
windfall gross up amounts are related to firm performance.
174. Rose & Wolfram, supra note 45, at 138.
175. This assumes that the cost of avoiding § 162(m) is higher than the cost of the lost
deduction and that the political costs of forfeiting deductions is not high.
176. Balsam & Yin, supra note 109.
177. Id. at 300.
178. This factor would increase the cost of substituting performance-based compensation
for cash compensation because the executive would demand a higher gross up for the additional
risk she would be facing.

64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 877 (2007)
the arm's length model, where firms would perform a cost-benefit analysis
in deciding whether to qualify compensation under § 162(m).
The large number of forfeitures would appear to be inconsistent with
the managerial power model for the two reasons described above. 179
However, the result could be consistent with this view if the disclosure
rules regarding the impact of § 162(m) 80 are not fully effective. In recent
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Balsam criticized the
required disclosures as "exceedingly vague."' 181 If so, the large number of
forfeitures would not be inconsistent with the managerial power model.
D. Conclusion
The empirical evidence regarding § 162(m) is somewhat ambiguous.
Most of the evidence cuts both ways in that it is consistent with both
models under certain conditions. However, the increase in overall
executive compensation amounts paid by unaffected firms is more
consistent with the managerial power model. On the other hand, the
prevalence of deduction forfeiture would appear more consistent with the
arm's length view, although the possibility of inadequate disclosure
undermines this conclusion.
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence confirms the intuition that
§ 162(m) is not helpful to shareholders. A number of studies have found
that executive compensation has increased since its enactment in 1993.
And the most recent study showed that a significant number of firms are
forfeiting deductions.
VI. Incidental Consequences
Thus far, this Article has suggested that the probable effect of
§ 162(m) under each of the two prevailing models is to increase executive
wealth at the expense of shareholders, a result directly contrary to that
intended by Congress. This section considers some other unintended
incidental consequences resulting from the enactment of § 162(m).

179. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 101,108.
181. See Effectiveness, supranote 85, at 3 (arguing that the current disclosure rules are
ineffective).
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A. Option Design
Critics of current executive compensation practices, such as Bebchuk
and Fried, often point to existing stock option design as proof that boards
are captured by management. 182 Firms universally issue stock options with
at-the-money exercise prices ("conventional options"). 183 Critics contend
that, absent board capture, firms would use indexed stock options (i.e.,
those whose exercise prices float with a relevant market index) because
they are both fairer and more effective in aligning incentives. 184 Using
indexed options (in lieu of conventional ones) would prevent windfalls for
executives of lagging firms in rising185markets and would continue to provide
incentives even in a down market.
Section 162(m), however, provides an incentive for firms to use
conventional options in lieu of indexed options because the latter fail to

qualify as performance-based compensation under existing Treasury
regulations. 186 The failure stems from the fact that the exercise price of an
indexed option has the potential to float below the fair market value of the
underlying stock at the time of grant, a disqualifying feature under the
87

regulations. 1

Section 162(m)'s preference for conventional options is problematic in
two ways. First, it can distort behavior, causing firms to use these arguably
less efficient options. 188 In addition, it provides a tax "excuse" to use these
options, thus making it harder to prove the claim that their universal use is
a symptom of poor corporate governance.

182. See BEBCHUK & FRIED supranote 6, at 137-64 (discussing conventional option plan
design and managerial power).
183. See id. at 143.
184. See id. at 144.
185. See id. at 143.
186. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1996) (setting forth stock option
qualification requirements under § 162(m)).
187. David Schizer argues that, while an argument can be made that indexed options could
qualify under the regulations, a well-advised taxpayer would not take that position without first
obtaining a favorable private letter ruling. See Schizer, supra note 90, at 1377-80 (noting that,
to date, no such private letter rulings have been issued).
188. Arguments have been made that conventional options are actually efficient
notwithstanding tax considerations. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 6, at 152-57
(identifying, analyzing, and ultimately rejecting these efficiency arguments).
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B. Restricted Stock
It has been suggested that firms could obtain better results by89
compensating management with restricted stock in lieu of stock options.
Restricted stock plans typically grant executives a number of shares in the firm
that vest ratably over a three-to-five-year period. Ifthe executive's employment
with the firm is terminated during the vesting period, then the executive forfeits
the unvested shares.
Restricted stock may provide better incentives than stock options for three
reasons. First, holders of options have a greater preference for risk than
stockholders because they do not suffer from reductions in stock price below
the exercise price. This could cause managers to prefer projects that are unduly
risky from the perspective of the stockholders.190 Second, options provide little
or no performance incentive effects when the stock price falls significantly
below the price at the time of grant.1 91 Finally, because compensatory stock
options are generally not dividend protected, 192 executives holding options have
incentives to cause the firm to avoid paying dividends. Instead, the option
holder has the incentive to cause the firm to use available cash to invest in new

189. See Murphy, supranote 88, at 738 (noting that restricted stock "continues to be one of
the most effective vehicles for providing both incentives and compensation to managers").
190. See id.
at 738 n.66 (stating that, unlike restricted stock, "options provide incentives
to... adopt excessively risky projects"); Murphy, supra note 135, at 17-18 (noting that
executives with options instead of restricted stock have incentives to engage in riskier projects).
Note, however, that this risk-preference may balance out to some extent the executive's inherent
risk-aversion with respect to firm-specific risk. See David Hirshleifer & Yoon Suh, Risk,
ManagerialEffort, and ProjectChoice, 2 J. FiN. INTERMEDIATION, 308, 308-45 (1992).
191. See Murphy, supra note 88, at 738 n.66 ("Restricted stock granted at $30 still
provides incentives when the price falls to $15, while stock options granted at $30 provide very
few incentives when the stock price falls significantly under the exercise price."); Murphy,
supra note 135, at 18 ("[O]ptions lose incentive value once the stock price falls sufficiently
below the exercise price that the executive perceives little chance of exercising. ..."). When
options are significantly "underwater," there has been pressure for the companies to reprice the
exercise price or to issue new options; this problem is avoided if restricted stock were used.
Hall & Murphy, supranote 52, at 59.
192. Dividend protected options are ones that would allow option holders to effectively
participate in dividend distributions made during the option period. The typical option holder is
hurt by dividend distributions because the value of her interest in the company is diminished by
the withdrawal of cash from the company without any corresponding receipt of cash by the
option holder. In 2003, Hall and Murphy noted that a "small number of companies offer
'dividend protection' for employee stock options, usually accomplished by paying the employee
accumulated dividends (plus interest) upon exercise of the underlying options." Hall &
Murphy, supra note 52, at 60.
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projects or institute share repurchase programs, which will result
in higher
93
share prices (and option values) than if dividends were paid out.'
Nevertheless, the § 162(m) regulations treat conventional stock options
more favorably than restricted stock, which is treated as qualified performancebased compensation only if the vesting conditions themselves are performancebased. Strictly time-vested restricted shares (i.e., those that vest after a period
of time provided that the employee remains employed with the company) are
thus not treated as qualified compensation. 194 As a result, the value of
restricted stock is generally subject to the $1,000,000 cap. 95 On the other
hand, conventional stock options, whether vested or not and regardless of the
type of any vesting conditions, are always treated as qualified compensation
exempt from the cap. Therefore, as in the case of option design, § 162(m)
impedes the ability of the firms to design arguably more efficient executive
compensation structures.
C. Accounting Manipulation
Section 162(m) created incentives for firms to substitute formulaic bonus
arrangements for discretionary ones because while the former qualifies as
performance-based compensation exempt from the $1,000,000 cap, the latter
does not. This preference for formulaic bonuses could result in greater
accounting manipulation by executives.
Most obviously, formulaic bonuses "encourage executives to focus on and
96
manipulate short-term earnings at the expense of long-term value creation."
More subtly, the technical design of formulaic bonuses could encourage
income-smoothing-the artificial redistribution of profits and losses from one
year to another-in order to achieve less variable net income. When
discretionary bonus plans give way to formulaic ones, the board loses discretion
and flexibility in awarding ultimate payouts. To reduce the impact of this loss,
boards will typically narrow the range of payouts generated under the formulaic

193. See Murphy, supra note 88, at 738 n.66 (noting that "options provide incentives to
lower dividend yields"); Murphy, supranote 135, at 18 (stating that "executives holding options
have incentives to avoid dividends and to favor share repurchases").
194. An example of performance-vested restricted stock is stock that vests only if the
company earnings increase by more than 5%.
195. The firm generally deducts the value of restricted stock at the time it vests. But if the
employee makes an election to include the value at the time of grant, then the firm deducts the
value of the restricted stock at the same time. See I.R.C. § 83(h) (2000).
196. Murphy, supranote 88, at 739.
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plan, as previously described.1 97 This narrower range of payouts creates an
incentive for executives to move earnings from very good years to other years
because the marginal benefit of going from a good year to a very good year is
often quite small. In fact, researchers have found that the rate of incomesmoothing is higher for firms that qualify their bonus arrangements under
§ 162(m) as compared to firms that do not. 98
D. Inflation Effects
Section 162(m)'s $1,000,000 threshold has not been adjusted for inflation.
When § 162(m) was enacted in 1993, 1,000,000 of today's dollars were worth
only roughly $700,000.'99 Put differently, if the $1,000,000 threshold were

properly adjusted for inflation, it would equal roughly $1,400,000.200 The
effect is that more companies will creep into the purview of § 162(m) simply by
adjusting executive pay for inflation even though their executives receive no
increased purchasing power. In addition, with respect to companies that are
already subject to § 162(m) because their nonqualified executive pay is in
excess of $ 1,000,000, more of their pay will be nondeductible even though they
are not increasing their executives' purchasing power. As a technical matter,
this problem can be alleviated quite simply by requiring automatic inflation
adjustments as a number of other Code provisions do, or by periodically
amending the threshold to account for past inflation. 20 However, such a fix
may be quite difficult to accomplish as a political matter. Legislators who
propose it will likely be subject to criticism for trying to make it easier for firms
the current
to pay fat-cat executives more than $1,000,000 in salary. In
20 2
political climate, this soundbite could be extremely dangerous.
197. See supranotes 102-03 and accompanying text.
198. See Reitenga et al., supra note 63, at 22.
199. Computed using inflation calculator found at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl
(last visited June 26, 2007). The precise value in 1993 dollars is $699,128.15.
200. Precise value is $1,430,352.94.
201. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1(0(2) (2000) (adjusting tax brackets for inflation); I.R.C.
§ 63(b)(4) (adjusting standard deduction amounts for inflation). One problem with requiring
inflation adjustments in the § 162(m) context is that executive compensation agreements
typically cover a number of years. Annual inflation adjustments would make it difficult for
firms to know how much salary they could pay in the future without triggering the provision.
One solution to this problem would be to require inflation adjustments on fixed schedules (e.g.,
every three or five years). Thus, to ameliorate the inflation problem, Congress could
immediately increase the cap to $1,400,000 (to reflect inflation since 1993) and then require the
cap to be increased for inflation at five-year intervals (i.e., in 2012, 2017, etc).
202. Nevertheless, there has been some public criticism of § 162(m) by legislators in the

CONTROLLING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
This suggests that the $1,000,000 cap-without inflation adjustmentsmay be around for awhile. If so, this means that, assuming a future annual
average inflation rate of 3%, the $1,000,000 cap will in reality be a $600,000
cap (in 1993 dollars) in five years and a $520,000 cap (in 1993 dollars) in ten
years.
E. Conclusion
The enactment of § 162(m) may have resulted in unintended adverse
consequences. The provision discourages the use of indexed options and
restricted stock to compensate executives even though their use may enhance
firm value. It also encourages nondiscretionary formulaic bonuses, which
encourage accounting gamesmanship. Finally, because of inflation, the
$1,000,000 threshold is effectively reduced over time even though no
affirmative legislative action has been taken.
VII. Conclusion
Under either the arm's length model or the managerial power model, the
likely effect of § 162(m) is to increase executive wealth and decrease firm
value. Under the arm's length view, where the board is assumed to act
faithfully in the shareholders' best interests, the provision is simply
unnecessary, imposing a deadweight loss that is bome by the parties. Unless
the entire economic burden is borne by the executive, her pay will increase and
firm value will decrease.
Under the managerial power view, where there is little faith in the board,
the effect is less clear. Leaving aside for a moment the symbolic value of the
provision, the enactment of § 162(m) would tend to increase executive wealth.
By introducing the provision into the mix, Congress provided an excuse for
boards to deviate substantially from existing executive compensation norms.
And by preferring certain types of compensation whose values are less salient
and more manipulable, § 162(m) arguably created an opportunity for even
greater mischief by boards and executives. On the other hand, the enactment of
§ 162(m) could have had positive symbolic impacts. Whether these impacts
outweigh its technical flaws is unclear.
wake of the recent back-dating scandal, though the relationship between the provision may be
tenuous. See Cicconi, supra note 125, at 1140-52 (describing the criticism by legislators that
§ 162 (m) contributed to the backdating scandal, but arguing that the empirical data suggests
that the criticism has been misplaced).
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The empirical evidence suggests that § 162(m) has had unintended
consequences. Executive compensation has increased, while a large number of
firms are apparently forfeiting valuable tax deductions. Both of these results
are contrary to the intent of Congress.
In addition, § 162(m) creates some perverse incentives. It discourages the
use of indexed options and restricted stock, even though these structures may
have better incentive effects than conventional options, which are preferred
under the provision. It encourages nondiscretionary formulaic bonus
arrangements, which themselves encourage accounting manipulation.
Perhaps the worst aspect of § 162(m) is its likely permanence. It would be
politically difficult, if not impossible, to repeal the provision. Proponents of
repeal would be criticized for trying to make it easier for firms to pay
executives more than $1,000,000 in performance-insensitive pay.
Congress has recently considered tax legislation that would penalize
employees who defer large amounts of compensation.203 This legislation is
clearly aimed at executive compensation, the levels of which have been the
subject of intense public scrutiny. The perverse effects of § 162(m) should give
Congress pause before it chooses to enact this or similar tax legislation
designed to control executive compensation.

203. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the Small Business and Work
Opportunity Act of 2007).

